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UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 163109 2014-01-22	MARICHU G. EJERA v. BEAU HENRY L. MERTO BERSAMIN, J.
Thirdly, the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the principle that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter again, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the rule. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and speedier solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, therefore, the courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. [42]
	GR No. 173349 2011-02-09	SAMUEL U. LEE v. BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY VELASCO JR., J.
In Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[39] this Court resolved in the negative the issue of whether private individuals can file with the SEC petitions for declaration in a state of suspension of payments. We held that Sec. 5(d) of PD 902-A clearly does not allow a mere individual to file the petition, which is limited to "corporations, partnerships or associations." Besides, We pointed out that the SEC, being a mere administrative agency, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and, as such, can only exercise those powers, which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. We, thus, concluded that where no authority is granted to hear petitions of individuals for suspension of payments, such petitions are beyond the competence of the SEC. In short, the SEC has no jurisdiction over private individuals relative to any petition for suspension of payments, whether the private individual is a petitioner or a co-petitioner. We have said time and again that the SEC's "jurisdiction is limited only to corporations and corporate assets;" it has no jurisdiction over the properties of private individuals or natural persons, even if they are the corporation's officers or sureties.[40] We have, thus, consistently applied this ruling to the subsequent Ong v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,[41] Modern Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[42] and Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.[43]
	GR NO. 133882 2006-09-05	ANGELA DELA ROSA v. ORFELINA D. ROLDAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
[27] Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 808, 828-829 (1998).
	AC. NO. 7055 2006-07-31	NORIEL MICHAEL J. RAMIENTAS v. ATTY. JOCELYN P. REYALA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
A point of clarification, however, is in order. While in the Halimao ruling we nevertheless treated the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villanueva as his Petition for Review before this Court within the contemplation of Rule 139-B, § 12 (c), such action on our part was necessitated by "expediency." In the case at bar, acknowledging the raison d''tre for the allowance of motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP in disciplinary cases against lawyers, which is the exhaustion of administrative remedies as expressly recognized by the same Halimao ruling, the remand of the case at bar back to the IBP is in order. This course of action rests upon the presumption that when the grievance machinery is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly,[18]
	GR NO. 142666 2005-09-26	METRO DRUG DISTRIBUTION v. METRO DRUG CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION – FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
Time and again, this Court has exhorted that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action."[21] This rule is certainly not without reason The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.[22]
	GR No. 155591 2004-09-22	DR. PABLO R. OLIVARES v. MAYOR JOEY MARQUEZ AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus may be resorted to only when there is no other plain, available, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.[7] Where administrative remedies are available, petitions for the issuance of these peremptory writs do not lie[8] in order to give the administrative body the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.[9]
	GR No. 159139 2004-01-13	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC PANGANIBAN, J.
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046,[5] which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous
	GR No. 138292 2002-04-10	KOREA EXCHANGE BANK v. FILKOR BUSINESS INTEGRATED QUISUMBING, J.
x x x[15] Petitioner's allegations in its complaint, and its prayer that the mortgaged property be foreclosed and sold at public auction, indicate that petitioner's action was one for foreclosure of real estate mortgage. We have consistently ruled that what determines the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[16] In addition, we find no indication whatsoever that petitioner had waived its rights under the real estate mortgage executed in its favor. Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that petitioner had abandoned its mortgage lien on Filkor's property, and that what it had filed was an action for collection of a sum of money.