This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2006-09-11 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court approved the attorney's fees in the total amounts of P750,000.00 plus 2 % interest for the services rendered by respondent in Civil Case No. 95-224. In this regard, the rule is that the issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees based on quantum meruit is a question of fact, and well-settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the lower courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons. The findings of the Court of Appeals by itself, which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court.[15] Thus, in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[16] Exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, and so this Court shall make its own determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case. | |||||
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2006-08-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Nevertheless, We agree with the Court of Appeals that it was incorrect for the RTC to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. The parties must be able to show that the stipulation is exclusive. Thus, sans words expressing the parties' intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any of the venues prescribed by law or stipulated by the parties, as long as the jurisdictional requirements are followed.[9] The subject clause contains no qualifying nor restrictive words, such as "must," or "exclusively," as would indicate the parties' intention "mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions to the courts of (Manila) only."[10] In the 8 December 2000 case of Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank,[11] where the venue stipulation contained the word "shall,"[12] we held that the stipulations of the parties "lack qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the agreed forum,"[13] and therefore "the stipulated place is considered only as an additional, not a limiting venue."[14] Consequently, the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint against CBC and Lim on ground of improper venue is erroneous, and was correctly reversed by the Court of Appeals. | |||||
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2006-08-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.[6] In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.[7] | |||||
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2006-08-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain facts have been established. Although it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[13] Since exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case. | |||||
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2005-09-21 |
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| Such factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court.[16] | |||||
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2004-06-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-25499, FEBRUARY 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 511, WHEN IT ARBITRARILY PEGGED THE MONTHLY LIVING EXPENSES AT 50% OF GROSS EARNINGS.[8] At the outset, it appears that petitioners call for this Court to review the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners assail the appellate court's affirmance of the finding by the trial court that Pleyto was negligent. The issue of negligence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages.[9] But it is well established that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law, not of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court. It must be stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties.[10] Factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[11] In the present petition, no compelling reason is shown by petitioners whatsoever for this Court to reverse those findings. Our examination of the records shows that the evidence clearly supports the following findings of the appellate court:The negligence and fault of appellant driver is manifest. He overtook the tricycle despite the oncoming car only fifty (50) meters away from him. Defendant-appellant's claim that he was driving at a mere 30 to 35 kilometers per hour does not deserve credence as it would have been easy to stop or properly maneuver the bus at this speed. The speed of the bus, the drizzle that made the road slippery, and the proximity of the car coming from the opposite direction were duly established by the evidence. The speed at which the bus traveled, inappropriate in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, is evident from the fact despite the application of the brakes, the bus still bumped the tricycle, and then proceeded to collide with the incoming car with such force that the car was pushed beyond the edge of the road to the ricefield (Paragraph 8, Affidavit of Rolly Orpilla marked Exh. "D" and Traffic Report marked Exh. "E", Folder of Exhibits)….[12] Indeed, petitioner Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations when he overtook the tricycle despite the presence of an oncoming car in the other lane. Article 2185 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, petitioners failed to present any convincing proof rebutting such presumption. | |||||