This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2003-06-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| While we find that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the conviction of the appellant for stabbing to death Rosemarie Reinante, we are unable to agree that treachery was proved by the prosecution. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be presumed and must be proved as sufficiently as the crime itself. Treachery or alevosia exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[26] To prove treachery, the prosecution must show (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (b) that the accused consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him.[27] Here, the prosecution failed to show adequately these requisite elements. | |||||
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2001-07-06 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| First. Accused-appellant admitted that he was responsible for the shooting of Egilberto Estalilla, but claimed that the gun went off and hit the victim as he and the latter grappled for possession of the firearm which allegedly belonged to accused-appellant. As accused-appellant thus invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is on him to show by clear and convincing evidence (1) that he was not the unlawful aggressor; (2) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) that he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is indispensable since the theory of self-defense is based on the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the aggression.[34] | |||||
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2001-02-19 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) the offender has not been arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.[41] Needless to say, it is indispensable that the accused must in fact surrender to the custody of a person in authority or of his agent.[42] Here, although accused-appellant went to see his cousin to surrender, he did not actually do so because he agreed, at the suggestion of his cousin, to just post bail after he has been arrested. Accused-appellant, therefore, went back home. | |||||