This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2003-03-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| After scrutiny of the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court that self-defense was not established by appellant. He testified that he initially inflicted only a single hack wound on the neck of Jose causing the latter to fall to the ground. He then went to the aid of his brother Carlito but upon finding that he was already dead, he went back to where Jose fell. Appellant admitted that at that time, Jose was in a lying position still alive but hardly moving.[8] Under such a situation, Jose could have hardly put up any defense, much less, make an aggressive move against appellant. Despite Jose's condition, appellant repeatedly hacked Jose. Granting that Jose was the one who first committed unlawful aggression, appellant was no longer justified in further inflicting wounds upon Jose because at that time, the latter was already lying helpless on the ground. At that moment, unlawful aggression on the part of Jose had ceased. It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.[9] Hence, the fact that unlawful aggression on the part of Jose already ceased when Marcelo repeatedly hacked him rules out the possibility of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.[10] Thus, the first assigned error is without merit. | |||||
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2001-12-21 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the witnesses never saw how the killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses did not see the commencement of the assault and the importance of such testimonies cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from mere suppositions.[38] And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, treachery can in no way be established.[39] Hence, without the existence of treachery accused-appellant can only be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939. | |||||
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2001-10-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the question of whether the means employed by appellant were reasonable, the number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the deceased shows that the means employed were hardly reasonable at all. Assuming arguendo that the victim fired first at appellant, a single shot could have already disabled the former who was inebriated. The nature and number of wounds inflicted upon the victim are important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense.[27] The gruesome, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted upon the deceased show that appellant's act was not one of self-defense, but was a determined and purposeful attack upon the victim.[28] | |||||
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2001-02-26 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Evident premeditation to be considered must have these elements: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[17] These elements must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated.[18] Here, since there is no showing as to when and how the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered to exist.[19] | |||||
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2000-11-23 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Indeed, circumstances qualifying a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.[30] Evident premeditation, for instance, must be clearly proven, established beyond reasonable doubt and must be based on external acts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning.[31] In this case, no evidence was presented to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or the time which elapsed after the determination of the commission of the crime. Thus, evident premeditation cannot be considered.[32] | |||||