This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2011-02-09 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In Chung Ka Bio v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[39] this Court resolved in the negative the issue of whether private individuals can file with the SEC petitions for declaration in a state of suspension of payments. We held that Sec. 5(d) of PD 902-A clearly does not allow a mere individual to file the petition, which is limited to "corporations, partnerships or associations." Besides, We pointed out that the SEC, being a mere administrative agency, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and, as such, can only exercise those powers, which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. We, thus, concluded that where no authority is granted to hear petitions of individuals for suspension of payments, such petitions are beyond the competence of the SEC. In short, the SEC has no jurisdiction over private individuals relative to any petition for suspension of payments, whether the private individual is a petitioner or a co-petitioner. We have said time and again that the SEC's "jurisdiction is limited only to corporations and corporate assets;" it has no jurisdiction over the properties of private individuals or natural persons, even if they are the corporation's officers or sureties.[40] We have, thus, consistently applied this ruling to the subsequent Ong v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,[41] Modern Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[42] and Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals.[43] | |||||