This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2012-07-04 |
BRION, J. |
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| While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,[43] Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.[44] With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order. | |||||
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2008-11-11 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Petitioner asks this Court to first look into the circumstances of the case and thereafter determine the propriety of issuing a suspension order. The Court could not be more explicit than its ruling in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,[23] thus:Petitioners would now have this Court strike down these resolutions because supposedly rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court will not do so. In no sense may the challenged resolutions be stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical, oppressive, egregiously erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. On the contrary, in promulgating those resolutions, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to the clear command of the law and what it calls a "mass of jurisprudence" emanating from this Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed that the theory of "discretionary suspension" should still be advocated at this late date, despite the "mass of jurisprudence" relevant to the issue, is little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest Court of the land.[24] | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| This is not say, however, that the assailed suspension resolution of the Sandiganbayan, insofar as it imposed a 90-day preventive suspension instead of the maximum 60 days prescribed by Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),[16] is flawed. Far from it. As may be noted, the anti-graft court ordered the petitioner's suspension on the basis of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019,[17] malversation of public funds being an offense involving fraud against government funds and is clearly included among the crimes contemplated under said section. Be that as it may and given the presumptive validity of the information in question, petitioner's urging for the Court to strike down the suspension order cannot be granted. As the Court articulated in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan,[18] citing what then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa referred to therein as the "mass of jurisprudence":The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; ... | |||||