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CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

This case has been cited 18 times or more.

2015-09-09
JARDELEZA, J.
On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense.[10] He claimed that a public officer may only be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the undue injury must not only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[11] Castillo asserted that the claim of undue injury must be "specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty."
2015-08-11
BRION, J.
Certainly, these repeated, illegal transfers of public funds to Napoles’ control, purportedly for projects which did not, however, exist, and just as repeated irregular disbursements thereof, represent quantifiable, pecuniary losses to the Government constituting undue injury within the context of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.[152]
2013-11-27
ABAD, J.
This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual damage" must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork.[5] The Court held in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan[6] that the element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime.
2013-07-10
SERENO, C.J.
Undue injury means actual damage.[83]  It must be established by evidence[84] and must have been caused by the questioned conduct of the offenders.[85]  On the other hand, unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference means giving a gain of any kind without justification or adequate reasons.[86]
2012-07-30
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The injury that Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 contemplates is actual damage as the term is understood under the Civil Code. In Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[50] the Court made this concept of undue injury very clear, saying: Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3 (e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
2011-06-06
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
More importantly, petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that it suffered damages when its property lost lateral support by reason of the collapsed retaining wall.  In the case of Santos v. People[26] cited in the case of  Soriano v. Marcelo,[27] the Court equated the concept of "undue injury," in the context of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,  with the civil law concept of "actual damage."  It is required that undue injury must be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.[28]  Speculative or incidental injury is not sufficient. The damages suffered cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork[29] but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts which could afford some basis for measuring compensatory or actual damage.  The Memorandum of the Office of the City Engineer of Baguio City, which petitioner has not refuted, clearly stated that "the retaining wall is located approximately 7.50 meters to the nearest building line of the complainant. x x x [T]he main structure of the complainant is evaluated to be outside the critical slip circle which is approximately 5.00 meters lateral distance from the retaining wall x x x." Absent any controverting evidence submitted by petitioner which would clearly prove actual damage of its property, the Ombudsman will not be faulted for relying on the said memorandum report.
2011-03-09
PEREZ, J.
In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual."  Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.[35]
2008-01-28
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Anent Criminal Case No. 20678, to hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[5] The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of respondent, causing him undue injury.[6]
2007-12-27
QUISUMBING, J.
As to petitioner's allegation of undue injury, the ruling of the Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[26] is instructive:After an employee, whose salary was withheld, fully received her monetary claims, there is no longer any basis for compensatory damages or undue injury, there being nothing more to compensate.[27] Moreover, in the case of Jacinto v. Sandiganbayan,[28] we held that:
2007-08-17
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[11] As may be noted, what contextually is punishable is the act of causing any undue injury to any party, or the giving to any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the public officer's functions.[12] The records disclose that Merit indeed tendered the lowest bid of Twelve Thousand Pesos (PP12,000.00) salary per month for every guard who will render eight hours of work per day. In fact, the BAC recommended to petitioner to award the security service contract to Merit. However, petitioner declined because Merit's bid price rate violates PADPAO's Memorandum Circular NR. 1, Series of 2001, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced hereunder: MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR
2007-06-26
GARCIA, J.
At any rate, to make out a prima facie case for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, proof of evident bad faith or manifest partiality will have to be adduced. Evident bad faith connotes more than a bad judgment; it implies a palpably dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity for some perverse motive or ill will.[67] Manifest partiality, on the other hand, denotes a notorious or plain bent or predilection to favor one side rather than the other.[68]
2006-11-30
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in relation to his public position; (3) that he causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[19]
2006-07-20
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Petitioner asserts that the defects and deficiencies adverted to by the State Auditors should be ventilated during the trial and cannot be used as basis for the withdrawal of the Information. He claims that he sustained undue injury, that is, the unnecessary expenses he incurred related to the subsequent transactions and the collection of his claims, such as litigation expenses. He admits that while the consequential undue injury cannot be ascertained yet, this has yet to be proven during the trial of the case. In any event, proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received can be perceived substantial enough and not merely negligible. He insists that he would not have sustained undue injury if the private respondents/accused had only acted accordingly and paid his just and valid claims on time.[31] He avers that the respondents and the Sandiganbayan cannot rely on the ruling of this Court in Llorente[32] because of the divergent factual setting therein.
2005-11-11
CALLEJO, SR., J.
In his comment on the petition, the Special Prosecutor alleged that the petitioner failed to establish that the Ombusman and the Deputy Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.  Citing the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[33] and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman,[34] the Special Prosecutor asserts that proof of the existence of the injury sustained by the private respondent is not required.
2003-10-17
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[43] The causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under the foregoing section.[44]
2003-07-22
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In the case of Llorente v. Sandiganbayan,[18] petitioner was charged with violation of Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019 for withholding the salaries and allowances of complainant. Petitioner was, however, acquitted because the prosecution failed to specify and prove any other loss or damage sustained by the complainant, other than the amount of the salaries and allowances justifiably withheld by the petitioner for failure of the complainant to comply with the required clearance and which was eventually received by her. Further, the alleged financial stress which complainant suffered was inadequate and largely speculative. The "long period of time" that her emoluments were withheld was not constitutive of "undue injury". In acquitting petitioner, it was held that:Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.[19] Petitioner's reliance in the ruling of the above-entitled case is misplaced. In the case at bar, we find that the undue injury to SPO1 Nicolas was indubitably proved, specified and quantified. SPO1 Nicolas suffered injury to the extent of P2,000.00, the amount he handed over to petitioner. The fact that the money extorted by petitioner was immediately recovered as a consequence of the NBI agents' timely entrapment will not in any way affect his criminal liability. Petitioner gained actual possession of the money and it matters not even if he had no occasion or opportunity to dispose of the same because at the precise moment he received the money and placed it inside his pocket with the evil motive of appropriating it as his own, the offense was already consummated. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in saying that the recovery of the money merely extinguished his civil liability arising from the commission of the crime.