This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2009-07-03 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments by action is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.[28] | |||||
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2009-06-09 |
CORONA, J. |
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| We will not countenance petitioner's brazen use of technicalities to defeat its legal obligation to respondent. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases[32] but they must not defeat a just claim. Moreover, petitioner cannot legally invoke a strict application of the rules of procedure because the delays were due to its own maneuvers to prolong the case. In Camacho v. CA and Dizon, et al.,[33] we held:It is revolting to the conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality. After all, the Rules of Court mandates that a liberal construction of the Rules be adopted in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. This rule of construction is [s]pecially useful in the present case where adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice.[34] | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| [10] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118339, March 19, 1998, 287 SCRA 611, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344 (1996). | |||||
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2006-10-23 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on their rights, respondents persistently pursued their rights of action. It is revolting to the conscience to allow petitioner to further avert the satisfaction of her obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality (citation omitted).[55] We also subtracted from the five (5)-year period the time when the judgment could not be enforced due to the restraining order issued by this Court,[56] and when the records of the case were lost or misplaced through no fault of the petitioner.[57] In Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, we likewise excluded the delays caused by the auditor's requirements which were not the fault of the parties who sought execution, and ruled that "[i]n the eight years that elapsed from the time the judgment became final until the filing of the restraining motion by the private respondents, the judgment never became dormant. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not apply."[58] In Jacinto v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court further held: Granting for the sake of argument that the motion for an alias writ of execution was beyond the five [5]-year limitation within which a judgment may be executed by mere motion, still under the circumstances prevailing wherein all the delay in the execution of the judgment lasting for more than eight [8]-years was beneficial to private respondents, this Court[,] for reasons of equity[,] is constrained to treat the motion for execution as having been filed within the reglementary period required by law.[59] (Emphasis supplied.) Republic v. Court of Appeals summed it up as follows: To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage (emphasis supplied).[60] In the case at bar, since the judgment of the CA became final on July 13, 1981, private respondent had filed several motions for and in support of its execution. After the dismissal of the appeal of Trans-Resource Management Corporation in 1985, private respondent moved for the inclusion of the Las Piñas property in the order of execution. He reasoned that the February 10, 1982 Writ of Execution could not be enforced against the Las Piñas property because the title number was already changed and could not be traced or found in the Register of Deeds.[61] | |||||