This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2013-02-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Furthermore, the very cases the appellate court cited provide that while conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence, the series of evidence presented to establish an accused's participation in the conspiracy must be consistent and should lead to no other conclusion but his participation in the crime as a conspirator.[147] After all, the conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the commission of the felony itself, for it is a "facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold."[148] | |||||
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2004-12-10 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.[27] Hence, if the totality of the circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper; otherwise, the accused must be acquitted.[28] | |||||
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2002-06-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As the evidence now stands, we are left to surmise whether Norberto Loreno or appellant Leysa fired the bullet that caused the death of the victim, Igmedio Larupay. Unfortunately, nothing on record could help us ascertain who of the two is legally responsible for Larupay's death. For while in theory, conspiracy could tie both men to the crime, we find that the trial court's finding of conspiracy is not supported by the evidence on record. Conspiracy must be proved. It cannot be surmised that conspiracy existed just because Norberto Loreno and appellant Leysa were both seen raising their arms and aiming at the victim. Conspiracy as a basis for conviction of appellant should be proved in the same manner as the criminal act.[21] Although direct proof is not essential,[22] conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself. It is a fundamental rule that a charge of conspiracy must be proven, just like any other criminal accusation, "independently and beyond reasonable doubt." [23] Mere simultaneous aiming by appellant and his co-accused at the victim with their firearms does not by itself demonstrate concurrence of will or unity of action or purpose that could be a basis for their collective responsibility.[24] | |||||