This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2010-01-06 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Anent accused-appellant's objection to the purported lack of corroboration of AAA's testimony, we find the same unmeritorious. The testimonies of complainant's companions at the river were dispensable and the absence thereof does not weaken the stand of the prosecution. The crime of rape is essentially one committed in secrecy, hence it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of forced coitus. As a result, conviction may be based solely on the plausible testimony of the private complainant.[30] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The workings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently, and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.[45] Besides, the rule is that delay in reporting the offense of incestuous rape is not necessarily an indication that the charge is fabricated. It does not diminish the complainant's credibility or undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, especially by one who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim.[46] | |||||
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2007-08-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| More significantly, we are not wont to accept, as insinuated by appellant's counsel, that in the clear light of day while working in an office, it is easy to reflect and reach the conclusion that the threat made on AAA, in the absence of a weapon, would not intimidate anyone into submission to the will of a rapist. In People v. Oarga[12] we held that intimidation was addressed to the mind of the victim and therefore subjective, and its presence could not be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the crime.[13] Furthermore, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed to commit rape be so great or of such character as could not be resisted because all that is required is that it be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.[14] The ambient circumstances must, therefore, be viewed from the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the rape.[15] Under the circumstances of the two cases, we find that the element of force or intimidation was sufficiently proven so as to negate the alleged consent on the part of AAA to the sexual intercourse that transpired on both April 10 and 19, 1999. | |||||