This case has been cited 7 times or more.
|
2014-03-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| The timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. "To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony."[37] | |||||
|
2008-07-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| The conflicting Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, notwithstanding, we find that petitioner was in peaceful possession of the subject property prior to its sale to respondent. Even if petitioner was not authorized by Zoila Acaylar to possess the subject property as administrator, his possession was not opposed and was, thus, tolerated by his parents. As we ruled in Arcal v. Court of Appeals[36]:The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by torelance refuses to comply with such demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. | |||||
|
2007-12-13 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.[18] The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.[19] Upon the refusal to vacate the property, the owner's cause of action accrues. | |||||
|
2004-06-03 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.[60] The defendant's refusal to comply with the demand makes his continued possession of the property unlawful.[61] The status of the defendant in such a case is similar to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.[62] | |||||
|
2004-06-03 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in the termination of the lease.[69] The tenant's withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence. | |||||
|
2003-09-10 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| While possession by tolerance may initially be lawful, it ceases to be so upon the owner's demand that the possessor by tolerance vacate the property.[11] To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession.[12] Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Sarona v. Villegas[13] elucidates thus:"A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word `tolerance' confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons. First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action for forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action."[14] In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The Complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner;[15] and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.[16] | |||||
|
2003-04-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned by respondents, still they are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom. Under appropriate circumstances, respondents may file, other than an ejectment suit, an accion publiciana -- a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess;[20] or an accion reivindicatoria -- an action to recover ownership of real property.[21] | |||||