This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-01-15 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| certiorari (C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP entitled Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation v. Development Bank of the Philippines). After the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, DBP sought the implementation of the order for the issuance of the writ of possession. Over Guariña Corporation's opposition, the RTC issued the writ of possession on June 16, 1982.[17] Judgment of the RTC | |||||
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2014-01-15 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In its decision promulgated on March 26, 2003,[20] however, the CA sustained the RTC's judgment but deleted the award of attorney's fees, decreeing: | |||||
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2009-09-02 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.[17] | |||||
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2009-07-13 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The DOJ, in reversing the City Prosecutor's finding of probable cause and ordering the discharge of Esperanza, noted that although the evidence on record fully supported the finding of probable cause against Sagum based on his admission that he forged herein respondent's signature on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage without the participation of Esperanza, there was no basis to hold that Esperanza conspired with him to effect the forgery. The DOJ, citing Dans, Jr. v. People,[17] ruled that conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven by competent proof, independently and beyond reasonable doubt. | |||||
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2009-03-02 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.[12] | |||||
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2007-09-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The case of Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (1st Division)[55] is instructive. Here, the Court granted the motion for reconsideration filed by former First Lady Imelda Marcos and acquitted her of the charge of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement not as a public officer, but as a private person. Thus, the Court found that the first element of the offense, i.e., that the accused is a public officer, was lacking. However, the acquittal of the former First Lady was taken in conjunction with the acquittal of the public officer with whom she was accused.[56] | |||||
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2002-06-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As the evidence now stands, we are left to surmise whether Norberto Loreno or appellant Leysa fired the bullet that caused the death of the victim, Igmedio Larupay. Unfortunately, nothing on record could help us ascertain who of the two is legally responsible for Larupay's death. For while in theory, conspiracy could tie both men to the crime, we find that the trial court's finding of conspiracy is not supported by the evidence on record. Conspiracy must be proved. It cannot be surmised that conspiracy existed just because Norberto Loreno and appellant Leysa were both seen raising their arms and aiming at the victim. Conspiracy as a basis for conviction of appellant should be proved in the same manner as the criminal act.[21] Although direct proof is not essential,[22] conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself. It is a fundamental rule that a charge of conspiracy must be proven, just like any other criminal accusation, "independently and beyond reasonable doubt." [23] Mere simultaneous aiming by appellant and his co-accused at the victim with their firearms does not by itself demonstrate concurrence of will or unity of action or purpose that could be a basis for their collective responsibility.[24] | |||||