This case has been cited 11 times or more.
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2011-04-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| As the records bear out, the due execution and genuineness of the photocopied letters of agreement and monthly statements of the BPJ Mastercard transactions of Valencia were never verified and confirmed. The basic rule is that these photocopied private documents are secondary evidence which are inadmissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of the originals.[46] Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. The Court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document, much less, accord it evidentiary value.[47] Regarding the photocopied letters of agreement, these were not even signed by Valencia. Thus, these letters of agreement relating to the alleged dollar time deposits of Valencia and his credit card billings are incompetent pieces of evidence unworthy of any probative value. | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Appellant's main defense is alibi, which is concededly the weakest defense.[8] Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused.[9] Courts may give credence to alibi only if there are credible eyewitnesses who can corroborate the alibi of the accused. Courts do not give credence to alibi if the corroboration comes from close relatives of the accused, and not from credible and disinterested persons.[10] | |||||
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2003-08-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| We have reviewed the testimonies and the evidence passed upon by the trial court and see no reason to depart from its findings. We reiterate the doctrine that the matter of appreciating evidence and assessing credibility of witnesses rests primarily with the trial court. In the absence of a clear showing that the court has ignored, overlooked or failed to properly appreciate matters of significance or substance likely to affect the eventual outcome of the case, its findings thereon are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate courts.[13] | |||||
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2002-09-17 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| by the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily included in his search and capture.[20] It is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the evidence adduced shows that it was the authorities who came looking for the accused.[21] Moreover, the evidence submitted by the prosecution belies the claim of the accused that he intended to submit himself to the authorities. The joint affidavit of the arresting officers, the veracity of which was admitted by the parties and evidenced by a 20 October 1999 Order | |||||
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2001-12-21 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| It must be noted that the testimonies of the witnesses show that accused-appellant surrendered himself on 3 September 1993 at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance the following requisites must concur: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and, (c) the surrender was voluntary.[44] All these requisites were present in this case as PO3 Feliciano Almojuela confirmed that on 3 September 1993, the day after the incident, accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up and his service firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan City.[45] Thus, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor. | |||||
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2001-02-20 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.[15] | |||||
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2000-06-30 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| While it is true that the essence of treachery is the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked,[25] the conditions set by law for the appreciation of treachery do not concur. These conditions are: (1) the means, method and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) such means, method or form of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused.[26] By swiftly attacking the victim from behind when he was engaged in a fight with another person, accused-appellant certainly did not give the victim an opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. The victim least expected the assault upon his person as his attention was focused on the fallen Tindenilla with whom he had exchanged fist blows. | |||||
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2000-02-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Appellant further raises the argument that the cause of death was not the three stab wounds inflicted on the victim, but rather, as testified by Dr. Muñoz, the piercing of the right lung by a broken rib. This fact, appellant insists, shows that there was no intent to kill. The argument is untenable. In this case, the testimony of the lone eyewitness that appellant's companion stabbed the victim three times is corroborated by the autopsy report. Vasquez further testified that the victim was stabbed at around 5:00 in the morning, while the autopsy report, the due execution and authenticity of which was duly admitted by the defense, placed the time of death at about 5:00 A.M.. The unbroken chain of events from the appellant's participation in the stabbing of the victim to the latter's death induces no other conclusion than that the accused's acts led to the victim's death.[23] | |||||