This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2004-05-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[14] Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors have a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.[15] | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Moreover, in criminal jurisprudence, when the issue is one of credibility of witness(es), appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court.[28] The conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses command great respect and consideration, especially when such conclusions are supported by the evidence on record.[29] | |||||
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2003-05-09 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The prosecution was able to establish that appellant's attack on Flores was from behind without any slightest provocation on his part[37] and that it was sudden and unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. Where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could only be described as treacherous.[38] There being treachery, appellant's conviction for murder is in order. | |||||
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2002-07-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| interfered with by appellate courts.[13] He submits that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued certain facts or circumstances of weight, which if considered, might affect the result of the case. More particularly, he insists that a careful perusal of the testimony of Thelma Bates would reveal marked contradictions, implausibilities, and improbabilities, rendering it both suspect and incredible. First, appellant points out that while Mrs. Bates claimed that she was only four to five meters away from her son when he was stabbed and the place was well lighted, she nonetheless could not describe the weapon used. According to appellant, her inability to describe | |||||
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2001-12-03 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In the present case, we find that conspiracy can be deduced from the circumstances surrounding the crime. Appellants and their co-accused performed concerted acts in pursuit of a joint purpose: they waylaid and surrounded the lone and unarmed victim, ganged up on him, and through blows delivered with a wooden club and a lead pipe, inflicted fatal injuries on him. Appellant Drew's contention that his neighbors and friends only surrounded the victim to protect and aid Drew is patently preposterous. True Drew ran off upon seeing the victim, but he immediately returned armed with a wooden club. But why he should arm himself against the victim who was showing no signs of harming him is not explained. The records do not show any sign of provocation or aggression on the part of the victim against Drew. Nor does the evidence show why Drew needed the aid and assistance of his friends and neighbors since the victim was not making any trouble for Drew. Instead, the records reveal that the victim, Cordial, Jr., was immediately surrounded by appellants and their companions. Without provocation, appellants fell upon the hapless victim with a wooden club and a lead pipe. Their companions then joined in to deliver kicks and blows. In People v. Datun, 272 SCRA 380 (1997), we found that there was conspiracy when the accused and their companions surrounded the victim and, without warning, inflicted fatal wounds upon him. In the present case, after the victim fell prostrate, appellants and their confederates fled the scene together. The acts of appellants before, during and after the incident indubitably point to a joint purpose, intent, and design to effect a common unlawful objective. Action in concert to achieve a common design is the hallmark of conspiracy. Hence, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators and the precise extent of participation of each of them becomes secondary.[37] | |||||
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2001-10-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. It has to be shown as clearly as the commission of the offense.[15] It need not be by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and participation.[16] It may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[17] | |||||
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2001-08-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The first issue raised by appellant is one of credibility. In criminal cases, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts as a rule will not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[26] Hence, the assessment of witnesses' credibility lies within the trial court's province and expertise.[27] There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as when the trial court has neglected to consider significant facts and circumstances of material importance which could lead to a different result. | |||||