This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2011-10-19 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In view of the above, we can hardly impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents COA, Escarda, and Dimagiba, for disallowing in audit the portion of retirement benefits in excess of what is allowed under our existing retirement laws. On the contrary, they acted with caution, diligence, and vigilance in the exercise of their duties, especially since what was involved were huge amounts of money imbued with public interest, since GSIS's funds come from the contributions of its members. Thus, GSIS's business is to keep in trust the money belonging to its members,[77] who are not limited to its own employees. | |||||
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2008-04-30 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Finally, we reiterate here that, with prudence and judicial restraint, a tribunal's zeal in bestowing compassion should yield to the precept in administrative law that absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, courts are loathe to interfere with and should respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies in fields where they are deemed and held to be experts due to their special technical knowledge and training.[31] Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens and millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur.[32] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial and quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be supported by substantial evidence.[28] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[29] | |||||
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2004-09-27 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| We further reiterate that disability should be understood less on its medical significance than on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.[35] Moreover, a person's disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.[36] | |||||
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2003-07-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, respondent's entitlement to permanent total disability was established by his medical records and by the investigation of the very agency he worked for, the PNP, which found him "UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE".[18] Even the initial findings of Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical Officer of the GSIS, Dumaguete City evinced that respondent is really qualified for permanent total disability benefits. Most of all, the decision of the PNP to retire him at the age of 55 for being unfit for police service is a clear indication that his heart ailment rendered him incapable of effectively and competently performing his job as a Police Chief Superintendent without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to his life.[19] In a number of cases, [20] it was ruled that the early retirement of an employee due to a work-related ailment, as in the case at bar, proves that he was really disabled totally to further perform his assigned task, and to deny permanent total disability benefits when he was forced to retire would render inutile and meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution. | |||||
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2003-03-26 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Clearly therefore, the "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioner's claim for compensation benefit arising from breast cancer. We are not experts in this field to rule that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred prior to January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago. Hence, the provisions of the Labor Code govern. For breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.[32] | |||||