This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-11-20 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| For further guidance, the Court finds it apt to point out that the same principles apply to the inverse situation of ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches designated as Special Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the ordinary civil case should then be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then order the raffling of the case to all branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations under existing internal rules, and the payment of the correct docket fees in case of any difference. Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated above, the re-raffling of an ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is permissible due to the fact that a particular branch which has been designated as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129.[52] To restate, the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the administration of all courts and the personnel thereof.[53] Certainly, an internal rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure. | |||||
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2013-06-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,[83] support pendente lite of the spouses and children,[84] the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,[85] and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.[86] A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."[87] In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. | |||||
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2010-08-03 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This is also true with respect to a motion for reconsideration before the Secretary of Justice. Review, whether on appeal or on motion for reconsideration, as an act of supervision and control by the Secretary of Justice over the prosecutors, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency may be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.[43] In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw the information, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses the finding of probable cause, is subject to the discretion of the court.[44] | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.[33] Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.[34] In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.[35] The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony. | |||||