This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-09-10 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The CA's reliance on Fabella v. Court of Appeals[12] is misplaced. That case did not involve a conflict between the jurisdiction of the CSC over administrative cases of public school teachers and the jurisdiction of the investigating committee under Section 9 of R.A. 4670. The doctrine in Fabella is simply that in a proceeding pending before the investigating committee the procedure set down in R.A. 4670 must be adhered to as a requirement of due process. | |||||
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2009-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings, which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[26] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[17] Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips down administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[18] | |||||
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2008-02-18 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| [i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[48] | |||||
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2005-06-08 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[18] In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[19] "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[20] | |||||
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2002-02-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We find merit in petitioner's contention that R.A. 4670 is good law and is applicable to this case. R.A. 4670 has not been expressly repealed by the general law P.D. 807, nor has R.A. 4670 been shown to be inconsistent with the presidential decree.[14] Section 2 thereof specified those who are covered by the term "teacher" as follows:SEC. 2. Title Definition. - This Act shall be known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers" and shall apply to all public school teachers except those in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities. | |||||
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2002-02-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| But we must stress that nothing herein should be deemed as overriding the provision in the Magna Carta for Teachers on the jurisdiction of the Committee to investigate public school teachers as such, and the observance of due process in administrative proceedings involving them, nor modifying prior decided cases of teachers on the observance of the said Magna Carta such as Fabella vs. Court of Appeals.[21] | |||||
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2002-02-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Petitioner claims that there was no valid case to dismiss him as Director Elmer Bartolata was not presented to ascertain the alleged forged signature contained in the questioned certificates of eligibility. The Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission made a finding on this fact of forgery. It is not this Court's function now to evaluate factual questions all over again. This is particularly true in this case, where the Commission and the appellate court agree on the facts.[34] | |||||