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GR No. 183445

2011-09-14

OFFICE OF PRESIDENT v. CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ

MENDOZA, J.

It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee.[44] As such, he was under the direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the President's power to remove is inherent in his power to appoint.[45] Therefore, it is well within the authority of the President to order the respondent's dismissal.

GR Nos. 165399 and 165475

2011-05-30

THERON V. LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MENDOZA, J.

Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe due process, well-established is the rule that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.[35] The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.[36] In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[37] this Court laid down the cardinal and primary rights to be observed and respected in administrative proceedings: (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[96] "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class."[97]

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute."[13]

GR No. 166620

2010-04-20

ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,[16] the Court likewise adverted to certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7645, the general appropriations law for 1993, as among the statutory bases for the President's power to reorganize executive agencies, to wit: Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:

GR NO. 160093

2007-07-31

MALARIA EMPLOYEES v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO

PUNO, C.J.

SEC. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.[10] We explained the nature of the President's residual powers under this section in the case of Larin v. Executive Secretary, [11] viz.:This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.[12] The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, clearly support the President's continuing power to reorganize the executive branch, viz.:

GR NO. 158960

2006-11-24

LORNA FRANCES FILIPINO v. F. WALTER R. MACABUHAY

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

As regards the second issue, we find that petitioner was not deprived of due process. It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.[27] Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard and given the opportunity to present his side.[28] In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held:Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.[30]

GR NO. 155088

2006-08-31

DR. MUSSOLINI C. BARILLO v. MARGARITO GERVACIO

TINGA, J.

In Larin v. Executive Secretary,[30] we held that where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this Court upon a clear and categorical finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.

	GR No. 183445 2011-09-14	OFFICE OF PRESIDENT v. CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ MENDOZA, J.
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee.[44] As such, he was under the direct disciplining authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the President's power to remove is inherent in his power to appoint.[45] Therefore, it is well within the authority of the President to order the respondent's dismissal.
	GR Nos. 165399 and 165475 2011-05-30	THERON V. LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MENDOZA, J.
Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe due process, well-established is the rule that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.[35] The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.[36] In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[37] this Court laid down the cardinal and primary rights to be observed and respected in administrative proceedings: (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[96] "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class."[97]
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute."[13]
	GR No. 166620 2010-04-20	ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,[16] the Court likewise adverted to certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7645, the general appropriations law for 1993, as among the statutory bases for the President's power to reorganize executive agencies, to wit: Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
	GR NO. 160093 2007-07-31	MALARIA EMPLOYEES v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO PUNO, C.J.
SEC. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.[10] We explained the nature of the President's residual powers under this section in the case of Larin v. Executive Secretary, [11] viz.:This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.[12] The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, clearly support the President's continuing power to reorganize the executive branch, viz.:
	GR NO. 158960 2006-11-24	LORNA FRANCES FILIPINO v. F. WALTER R. MACABUHAY YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
As regards the second issue, we find that petitioner was not deprived of due process. It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.[27] Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard and given the opportunity to present his side.[28] In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held:Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.[30]
	GR NO. 155088 2006-08-31	DR. MUSSOLINI C. BARILLO v. MARGARITO GERVACIO TINGA, J.
In Larin v. Executive Secretary,[30] we held that where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this Court upon a clear and categorical finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.

AQUILINO T. LARIN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY