This case has been cited 23 times or more.
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2016-01-20 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[140] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2014-09-29 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available in extraordinary cases where a tribunal, board or officer, among others, completely acted without jurisdiction. Ineluctably, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.[17] While errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari.[18] Considering that the OP had no jurisdiction to entertain private respondent's appeal, certiorari lies to correct such jurisdictional error. The CA thus erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of being an improper remedy. | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,[95] We explained that the basic notions of due process require the observance of this rule that refuses the effectivity of a decision that was rendered despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties: [B]asic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in cases involving jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties which a court must acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments personal to said defendants. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the manner required by law or otherwise by his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such defendant is null and void. A decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become final and executory. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[96] | |||||
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2009-07-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.[36] | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Needless to say, the failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries in OCT No. 40287 should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case.[35] Yet, although the action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action.[36] Thus, the orders issued by said court dated October 21, 1986 and November 7, 1986 never acquired finality.[37] Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.[38] | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Paraphrasing by analogy this Court's ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v. Sison,[39] a void order is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid order. It may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place and thus cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce the same. Accordingly, all proceedings founded on the void court order are themselves regarded as invalid, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no order issued by the court. It leaves the party litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.[40] A void order, like any void judgment, may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight.[41] | |||||
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2009-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the manner required by law or, otherwise, by his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such defendant is null and void. A decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not a decision in contemplation of law and can never become final and executory.[17] | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| To conclude, respondent's remedy is to raise before the DAR Secretary the matter of cancellation of petitioner's CLT as an incident of the order granting the landowners' application for retention over the said landholding. In the same forum, petitioners can raise the issue of the validity of the DAR order granting the application for retention based on their claim of denial of due process, or in a separate action specifically filed to assail the validity of the judgment. A collateral attack against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.[40] | |||||
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2008-08-06 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| However, if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, as in Civil Case No. 1330, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.[32] The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[33] The trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over the indispensable parties who are not impleaded in the case, and judgment thereon cannot be valid and binding against them. A decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in contemplation of law; hence, it can never become final and executory.[34] | |||||
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2008-07-14 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely--only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.[38] When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.[39] Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.[40] Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.[41] As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,[42] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.[16] | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Section 7. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties where possible and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.[10] It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed.[11] The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[12] The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment.[13] A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.[14] | |||||
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2007-01-31 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes as additional ground therefor denial of due process.[22] So Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[23] teaches:It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies available to a litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six months from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to annul for a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals. Thus, Macabingkil did not preclude the setting aside of a decision that is patently void where mere inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction or non-compliance with due process of law. [Emphasis in original]. This doctrine is recognized in other cases: | |||||
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2007-01-29 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| x x x. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. x x x. (Underscoring supplied) There are instances where a judge may commit errors. He may issue an order without authority. And if clothed with power, he may exercise it in excess of his authority or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Any of these acts may be struck down as a nullity through a petition for certiorari,[23] as what petitioners did before the Court of Appeals. It bears stressing that any act or order rendered by a judge without authority, such as the questioned November 25, 2004 Order, is no order at all. It is void. As such, it cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal force and effect.[24] | |||||
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2006-12-19 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In Arcelona, the Court also dwelt on the consequences of failure to include indispensable parties in a case, categorically stating that the presence of indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical power[41] and when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.[42] The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[43] | |||||
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2006-07-20 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Petitioners averred in their petition that the mortgaged property, their family home, was the conjugal property of their parents, but that their father's consent to the real estate mortgage was not obtained by their mother as mortgagor. By their claim, petitioners imply that, as beneficiaries and co-owners of the family home, they were indispensable parties in Civil Case No. C-425; consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction over their persons, and as such, all the proceedings before the RTC were null and void.[22] To support this claim, petitioners should have appended to their petition parts of the records of the RTC showing that the property is indeed their family home and part of the conjugal property of their parents. This could have established the need for them to be impleaded as parties-defendants. As the Court ruled in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals:[23] | |||||
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2006-03-10 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Lastly, with regard to the ground of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of the case, suffice it to say that petitioner never raised this issue before the RTC or the CA. It is being alleged for the first time only before the Court. The rule is that questions not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[28] Consequently, the Court will not dwell on said issue. | |||||
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2005-10-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| If petitioner Mayor is not impleaded as a party-respondent in the CA, he cannot be compelled to abide by and comply with its decision, as the same would not be binding on him. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.[35] Ergo, res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicrium facint.[36] A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by any proceeding in which he is a stranger.[37] | |||||
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2004-11-22 |
TINGA, J, |
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| While there is no more question as to the agency relationship between Baluyot and MMPCI, there is no indication that MMPCI let the public, or specifically, Atty. Linsangan to believe that Baluyot had the authority to alter the standard contracts of the company. Neither is there any showing that prior to signing Contract No. 28660, MMPCI had any knowledge of Baluyot's commitment to Atty. Linsangan. One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and circumspection.[52] Even assuming that Atty. Linsangan was misled by MMPCI's actuations, he still cannot invoke the principle of estoppel, as he was clearly negligent in his dealings with Baluyot, and could have easily determined, had he only been cautious and prudent, whether said agent was clothed with the authority to change the terms of the principal's written contract. Estoppel must be intentional and unequivocal, for when misapplied, it can easily become a most convenient and effective means of injustice.[53] In view of the lack of sufficient proof showing estoppel, we refuse to hold MMPCI liable on this score. | |||||
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2004-09-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Estoppel likewise applies. For one, respondent lacked "knowledge and x x x the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question";[73] namely, whether petitioner's counsel had any authority to bind his principal. Moreover, respondent relied "in good faith"[74] upon petitioner's conduct and statements; and its action "based thereon [was] of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice."[75] If it was also true that petitioner's counsel exceeded his authority in entering into the Receipt/Agreement, the negligence or omission of petitioner to assert its right within a reasonable time only warranted a presumption that it either abandoned or declined to assert it.[76] | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence."[81] It is hardly separable from the waiver of a right.[82] The party claiming estoppel must show the following elements: "(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice."[83] | |||||
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2001-06-28 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.[20] The fact that petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares' possession be considered sufficient payment of the disputed lots, could not be cited against it. For one thing, petitioner from the very start had always consistently questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3) years after the case had in fact been executed. Secondly, estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.[21] | |||||
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2000-06-08 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a final and executory judgment may be set aside through a petition for relief from judgment within the period prescribed therefor. However, even beyond the period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 38,[51] a party aggrieved by a judgment may petition for its annulment on two (2) grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud.[52] The nullity of a judgment based on lack of jurisdiction may be shown not only by what patently appears on the face of such decision but also by documentary and testimonial evidence found in the records of the case and upon which such judgment is based.[53] We find that the record of this case sufficiently warrants a ruling on the jurisdiction of the Pasig RTC over LRC Case N-138. | |||||