This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-05-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In New Pacific Timber,[14] which petitioner cited, we ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, using Article 218(c) as part basis, when it entertained the petition for relief filed by a party and treated it as an appeal, even if it was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Before that case, we invoked the same Labor Code provision in City Fair Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[15] and Judy Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[16] to justify our ruling that the NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it allowed in both cases the appeal of a party even if it was filed a day, or even a few days, late. Similarly, we held in Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon,[17] that substantial justice is best served by permitting the NLRC to allow a petition for relief filed by a party despite the earlier commission of a procedural defect of filing the motion for reconsideration three days late on the strength of Article 218(c) and other pertinent labor law provisions. In Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[18] we held that procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed in NLRC proceedings owing to the relaxation of technical rules of procedure in labor cases as well as to Article 218(c). We likewise held in Aguanza v. Asian Terminal, Inc.,[19] that the insufficiency of a supersedeas bond is a defect in form which the NLRC may waive. Furthermore, in Independent Sagay-Escalante Planters, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[20] we ruled that the NLRC had ample authority, under Article 218(c), to disregard the circumstance that the appeal fee had been tardily paid by one party and to order both parties to present evidence before the Labor Arbiter in support of their claims. Lastly, in Faeldonia v. Tong Yak Groceries[21] and Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena,[22] we used Article 218(c) to justify the NLRC's reversal of the Labor Arbiter's factual conclusions. However, in both cases, there was no objection that the NLRC passed upon issues that were not raised on appeal. | |||||
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2009-01-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| [42] Pison-Arceo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 344 Phil. 723, 732 (1997). | |||||
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2006-07-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As a rule, a party who did not appeal from a decision of a court cannot obtain affirmative relief other than that granted in the appealed decision.[5] This applies also to decisions of administrative or quasi-judicial tribunals.[6] In the present case, however, while respondents did not appeal from CSC Resolution No. 991110 dated May 27, 1999 which merely ordered reinstatement and that they raised the issue of backwages only in the present motion, these did not preclude them from praying for the monetary benefits provided by law. Where an ironhanded application of the rules will result in an unmistakable failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case.[7] This Court is, therefore, constrained to relax the rules to give way to the supreme and overriding interest of labor and justice. Indeed, laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all.[8] | |||||