This case has been cited 21 times or more.
|
2015-06-17 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| Thirdly, the jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings.[9] This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate,[10] unless the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agree to submit the question for determination by the probate or administration court and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced;[11] or unless the purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory, in which case the probate or administration court may decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but such determination is not final and is without prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action.[12] Otherwise put, the determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction.[13] | |||||
|
2015-02-23 |
SERENO, C.J. |
||||
| The law does not relieve a party from the consequences of a contract it entered into with all the required formalities.[32] Courts have no power to ease the burden of obligations voluntarily assumed by parties, just because things did not turn out as expected at the inception of the contract.[33] It must also be emphasized that AMA is an entity that has had significant business experience, and is not a mere babe in the woods. | |||||
|
2011-06-08 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. [15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. [16] As held in several cases, [17] a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. | |||||
|
2011-05-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Like any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and principles of a contract. It is a consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.[76] Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.[77] A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata[78] and this holds true even if the agreement has not been judicially approved.[79] In addition, as a binding contract, a compromise agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it.[80] | |||||
|
2011-03-16 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration. Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal.[62] The issues were first raised only in the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, thus, it is as if they were never duly raised in that court at all. "Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, entertain these issues, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process. The Court reiterates and emphasizes the well-settled rule that an issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel.[63] | |||||
|
2008-03-12 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| The Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the second issue considering the foregoing discussion. At any rate, petitioners raise for the first time before this Court the issue of whether their exoneration by the CSC is subject to review by the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that "(a)n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel." [15] Further, failure to invoke timely a procedural rule in favor of a party constitutes a waiver of such rule.[16] | |||||
|
2007-10-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise agreement was defined as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced." In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held that a "compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases."[17] | |||||
|
2007-10-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Moreover, even without the minutes of the meeting and the acknowledgment receipt, the amicable settlement, or more specifically the compromise agreement, entered into by the parties is undeniably valid, considering that "a compromise agreement is a consensual contract, and as such, it is perfected upon the meeting of' the minds of the parties to the contract."[23] | |||||
|
2006-08-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| Evidently, both parties in this case breached their respective obligations. The well entrenched doctrine is that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous contract, entered into with full awareness of what he was doing and entered into and carried out in good faith. Such a contract will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact. Courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of the contract entered into by and between the parties or to render a decision different therefrom. They have no power to relieve parties from obligation voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.[37] However, in situations such as the one discussed above, where it cannot be conclusively determined which of the parties first violated the contract, equity calls and justice demands that we apply the solution provided in Article 1192 of the Civil Code:Art. 1192. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be determined which of the parties first violated the contract, the same shall be deemed extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages. | |||||
|
2006-04-19 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| The well-entrenched doctrine is that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous contract, entered into with full awareness of what he was doing and entered into and carried out in good faith. Such a contract will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact. Courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of the contract entered into by and between the parties or to render a decision different therefrom. They have no power to relieve parties from obligation voluntarily assailed, simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals.[45] | |||||
|
2005-08-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| As in any other contract, it is perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which constitutes the contract.[50] It is perfected upon the meeting of the minds and does not need a judicial approval for its perfection.[51] | |||||
|
2005-08-09 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.[16] | |||||
|
2005-08-08 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| As regards the ancillary procedural question concerning the propriety of certiorari in lieu of appeal, we find that private respondents' resort to certiorari is warranted under the circumstances. While it is true that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal, jurisprudence exempts from the application of this rule cases when the trial court's decision or resolution was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[17] Considering that the trial court in this case completely disregarded the fact that private respondents also filed the complaint on their own behalf and in so doing prevented the latter from having their day in court, it gravely abused its discretion justifying private respondents' petition for certiorari. | |||||
|
2005-07-08 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| As regards the ancillary procedural question concerning the propriety of certiorari in lieu of appeal, we find that private respondents' resort to certiorari is warranted under the circumstances. While it is true that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal, jurisprudence exempts from the application of this rule cases when the trial court's decision or resolution was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[17] Considering that the trial court in this case completely disregarded the fact that private respondents also filed the complaint on their own behalf and in so doing prevented the latter from having their day in court, it gravely abused its discretion justifying private respondents' petition for certiorari. | |||||
|
2005-02-11 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Courts do not have the power to relieve parties of obligations voluntarily assumed.[54] | |||||
|
2004-09-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| Moreover, the Receipt/Agreement is not a promise to pay that "amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of petitioner."[81] A compromise agreement is "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced."[82] No such reciprocal concessions[83] were made in this case. Thus, the Receipt/Agreement is but an outright admission of petitioner of its obligation, after making partial payment, to pay the balance of its account. And even if we were to consider the same as a compromise, from its nature as a contract, the absence of an SPA does not render it void, but merely unenforceable.[84] | |||||
|
2004-04-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Able counsels represented both parties. We see no claim that either counsel erred or was negligent. This could only mean that petitioners' counsel chose to waive, or did not consider important, the defense of prescription and laches. Petitioners are bound by their counsel's choice. Other than arguing that it is allowable to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, we have no explanation from petitioners why they suddenly decided to change their mind. Parties are not allowed to flip-flop. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who choose to go to trial haphazardly. Moreover, it would be grossly unfair to allow petitioners the luxury of changing their mind to the detriment of private respondents at this late stage. To put it simply, since petitioners did not raise the defense of prescription and laches during the trial, they cannot now raise this defense for the first time on appeal.[13] | |||||
|
2002-08-01 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| the trial court ordinarily will not be considered by the appellate court, as such cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[22] Nonetheless, when an accused appeals, he re-opens the whole case[23] and if only to serve the interests of substantial justice, we shall pause to consider appellant's "sweetheart defense." In many a rape case, the defense that the rapist and the victim are lovers is often raised, but is also often struck down for want of sufficient and convincing proof. Having invoked the positive defense of a romantic relationship with the victim, appellant bears the burden of | |||||
|
2002-01-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| [42] Sanchez vs. CA, G.R. No. 108947, 279 SCRA 647, 679 (1997). | |||||
|
2001-12-07 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| While indeed private respondents did not meet head on this issue, we find that it should be properly addressed. In filing the petition before the Court of Appeals, petitioners sought the appellate court's declaration that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. In their view, the trial court should have enforced the compromise agreement instead of rescinding it. Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1191 of the New Civil Code which concerns rescission of contract. Applicable here is Article 1159 which enjoins compliance in good faith by the parties who entered into a valid contract.[16] Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or put an end to one already commenced.[17] | |||||
|
2000-02-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| To begin with, it is not denied that the two subject documents are notarized documents and, as such, are considered public documents which enjoy the presumption of validity as to authenticity and due execution.[8] One of the documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, was identified by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maximo Quero, the administering officer who had notarized it. The legal presumption of validity of petitioners' duly notarized public documents has not been overcome by preponderant evidence by private respondent, upon whom the burden of proof rests, having alleged the contrary.[9] | |||||