This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2016-02-03 |
BRION, J. |
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| It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what has been given is in order."[52] This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that "every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract. | |||||
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2016-01-13 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Case law also provides that the fact that the seller is not the owner of the subject matter of the sale at the time of perfection does not make the sale void.[77] | |||||
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2014-01-15 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| otherwise is to sanction the act of entering into transaction the object of which is expressly prohibited by law and thereafter execute an apparently valid contract to subterfuge the illegality. The legal proscription in such an instance will be easily rendered nugatory and meaningless to the prejudice of the general public.[12] Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law is a void or inexistent contract. As such, a void contract cannot produce a valid one.[13] To the same effect is Article 1422 of the Civil | |||||
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2011-09-07 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The general principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better title than he has.[32] Only the owner of the goods or one authorized by the owner to sell can transfer title to the buyer.[33] Therefore, a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.[34] | |||||
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2007-02-09 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| One repurchases only what one has previously sold. The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties.[53] By insisting that he had repurchased the property, respondent thereby admitted that the deed of absolute sale executed by him and petitioner on April 13, 1982 was, in fact and in law, a deed of absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage; hence, he had acquired ownership over the property based on said deed. Respondent is, thus, estopped from asserting that the contract under the deed of absolute sale is an equitable mortgage unless there is allegation and evidence of palpable mistake on the part of respondent;[54] or a fraud on the part of petitioner. Respondent made no such allegation in his pleadings and affidavit. On the contrary, he maintained that petitioner had sold the property to him in July 1985 and acknowledged receipt of the purchase price thereof except the amount of P39,000.00 retained by Perlita Ventura. Respondent is thus bound by his admission of petitioner's ownership of the property and is barred from claiming otherwise.[55] | |||||