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FLORENCIO G. BERNARDO v. SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION OF CA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 161083 2010-08-03	PEOPLE v. BASILIO R. GABO PERALTA, J.
It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when, "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," and certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lost appeal.[30]
	GR No. 162286 2009-06-05	GLEN PASCUAL Y MALUMAY v. PEOPLE PERALTA, J.
The CA is correct in its finding that petitioners were aware of the notice to file brief, since what the petitioners disclaimed knowledge of was only their counsel's motion for extension to file the brief. The previous pleadings, as well as the petition itself, are without any claim by petitioners that they had no knowledge of the notice to file brief with the CA. No allegation was even made that after the discovery of the dismissal of their case by the CA, petitioners asked or confronted their lawyer for the latter's failure to file the brief. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case.[29]
	GR NOS. 141810 & 141812 2007-02-02	VICENTE DELOS SANTOS v. FRED ELIZALDE VELASCO, JR., J.
True enough, the party-litigant should not rely totally on his counsel to litigate his case even if the latter expressly assures that the former's presence in court will no longer be needed. No prudent party will leave the fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings may be negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for several months (four, in this case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case. Petitioner simply claims that he was busy with his gravel and sand and trading businesses which involved frequent traveling from Manila to outlying provinces. But this was not a justifiable excuse for him to fail to ask about the developments in his case or to ask somebody to make the query for him. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence; hence, his plea that he was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this Court's approval or even sympathy.[40] (Emphasis supplied.) Concurrently, petitioners did not even know that Atty. Victoriano failed to file an appellants' brief on their behalf during the more than one hundred eighty (180)-day extension that he sought from the CA, aside from their failure to learn of the Decision of the appellate court. Ordinary prudence would dictate that petitioners must give utmost importance to the case considering that it involves their residences, presumably their most valued material possession, and considering further that they had already lost at the trial court. Petitioners' failure to apprise themselves of the status of the case from the time that Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the notice to file brief on June 15, 1998 up to June 2, 1999, when petitioners allegedly obtained a copy of the assailed Decision from the CA, is unjustified. Petitioners cannot be shielded from the repercussions of their counsel's and their own negligence. Petitioners themselves are as much to blame in losing their appeal.
	GR NO. 155737 2005-10-19	R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE HAWK TRANSPORT CORPORATION QUISUMBING, J.
Respondent submits that petitioner's argument is misleading because a copy of the decision was earlier sent to the last known address appearing on record of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Uy. It is the fault of petitioner's counsel, adds respondent, that Atty. Uy was not able to receive the decision since he had not filed any notice of change of address. Citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,[6] respondent maintains that petitioner is bound by the mistakes of his counsel.
	GR No. 136114 2004-01-22	LANDBANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN AGENCY INCORPORATED SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
First, petitioner's remedy is an appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeals' Decision dated July 31, 1998 by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, it filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 only on November 18, 1998 or forty three (43) days after it received the Appellate Court's Decision denying its motion for reconsideration. Apparently, petitioner resorted to certiorari because it failed to interpose an appeal seasonably. This, of course, is a procedural flaw. Time and again we have reminded members of the bench and bar that the special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.[11]
	GR No. 142056 2001-04-19	EVELYN ONG v. CA AND SPS. RICHARD AND NILDA CABUCOS BELLOSILLO, J.
Petitioners now come to us by way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals. But they have not substantiated their claim. In fact, it is not unlikely that they merely availed of such remedy because their period within which to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals had already expired. They received copy of the Court of Appeal's Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 28 January 2000, thus they had until 12 February within which to appeal to this Court. They did not do so but opted to come to us on certiorari. Their petition was posted on 21 February 2000.[5] But certiorari, this Court emphasizes, is not a substitute for lost appeal.[6] Even on the merits, the petition must fail as it does not provide any reason for this Court to disagree with the uniform ruling of the three (3) lower courts. Petitioners' alleged possession of subject property since 1972 cannot render nugatory the right of respondents as holders of a certificate of title. Prescription does not run against registered land. A title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession.[7] The subject property was previously titled in the name of spouses Pedro and Josefa Quiamco, then transferred to Trinidad, and later to respondents. Moreover, in asserting ownership by donation, petitioners were in effect assailing the title of respondents. The Court of Appeals correctly brushed aside this argument of petitioners by invoking our ruling that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on its validity can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.[8] Having failed to show any right to possess subject property, petitioners must surrender possession to respondents as the new owners and rightfully entitled thereto.