Lawyerly

GR No. 207900

2014-04-22

PERALTA, J.

Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition on January 31, 2013.[6] On that same day, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed[7] Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency.

GR No. 207900

2014-04-22

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC

PERALTA, J.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.[32]

GR No. 182249

2013-03-05

TRADE v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

BRION, J.

But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement.[31]

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest number of votes (second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning candidate be disqualified by final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.[28] The same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and within the realm of notoriety, of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate. In this situation, the electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously disqualified candidate is simply deemed to have waived their right to vote.[29]

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate's disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[64] Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.[65] But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby's ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the elections.

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x x.[49]

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

Castillo's petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.[37] The petition expressly challenged Ramon's eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent [Ramon] be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."[38]

GR No. 195229

2012-10-09

EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office front the time the judgment of conviction against hint became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.[26]

GR No. 192856

2011-03-08

FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMELEC

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

The exception to the second placer rule is predicated on the concurrence of the following: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[62] These facts warranting the exception to the rule are not present in the case at bar. As noted by Commissioner Velasco, the date of promulgation of the resolution declaring Gonzalez disqualified to be a candidate in the May 10, 2010 was not a previously fixed date as required by Section 6[63] of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 as the records do not show that the parties were given prior notice thereof. In fact, Gonzalez through his counsel received a copy of the May 8, 2010 Resolution only on May 11, 2010, one day after the elections.

GR NO. 169106

2006-06-23

DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT v. COMELEC

QUISUMBING, J.

It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.[24] This rule admits an exception. But this exception is predicated on the concurrence of two requisites, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[25] The facts warranting the exception do not obtain in this case.

GR Nos. 154796-97

2003-10-23

RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Respondent Alcoreza, however, alleges that her proclamation as the elected Punong Barangay was legal and valid. Alcoreza claims her case falls under the exception to the rule that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the candidate with the next higher number of votes to be proclaimed winner. Alcoreza cites Grego v. COMELEC[47] which held that the exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.

	GR No. 207900 2014-04-22	MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition on January 31, 2013.[6] On that same day, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed[7] Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC in SPA No. 13-106(DC)(F) for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency.
	GR No. 207900 2014-04-22	MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.[32]
	GR No. 182249 2013-03-05	TRADE v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BRION, J.
But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement.[31]
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest number of votes (second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning candidate be disqualified by final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.[28] The same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and within the realm of notoriety, of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate. In this situation, the electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously disqualified candidate is simply deemed to have waived their right to vote.[29]
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate's disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[64] Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.[65] But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby's ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the elections.
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x x.[49]
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
Castillo's petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.[37] The petition expressly challenged Ramon's eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent [Ramon] be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."[38]
	GR No. 195229 2012-10-09	EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office front the time the judgment of conviction against hint became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.[26]
	GR No. 192856 2011-03-08	FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMELEC VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The exception to the second placer rule is predicated on the concurrence of the following: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[62] These facts warranting the exception to the rule are not present in the case at bar. As noted by Commissioner Velasco, the date of promulgation of the resolution declaring Gonzalez disqualified to be a candidate in the May 10, 2010 was not a previously fixed date as required by Section 6[63] of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 as the records do not show that the parties were given prior notice thereof. In fact, Gonzalez through his counsel received a copy of the May 8, 2010 Resolution only on May 11, 2010, one day after the elections.
	GR NO. 169106 2006-06-23	DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT v. COMELEC QUISUMBING, J.
It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified.[24] This rule admits an exception. But this exception is predicated on the concurrence of two requisites, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.[25] The facts warranting the exception do not obtain in this case.
	GR Nos. 154796-97 2003-10-23	RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Respondent Alcoreza, however, alleges that her proclamation as the elected Punong Barangay was legal and valid. Alcoreza claims her case falls under the exception to the rule that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the candidate with the next higher number of votes to be proclaimed winner. Alcoreza cites Grego v. COMELEC[47] which held that the exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.

WILMER GREGO v. COMELEC