This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2012-09-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been paid.[15] The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not giving the proper notice of dishonor. The nature of this opportunity for the accused to avoid criminal prosecution has been expounded in Lao v. Court of Appeals:[16] | |||||
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2009-02-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the accused. The accused has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the same to afford him/her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.[28] | |||||
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2008-11-14 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the second element, petitioner disputes notice of insufficiency of funds on the basis of the check being issued in blank. He relies on Dingle v. Intermediate Appellate Court[33] and Lao v. Court of Appeals[34] as his authorities. In both actions, however, the accused were co-signatories, who were neither apprised of the particular transactions on which the blank checks were issued, nor given notice of their dishonor. In the latter case, Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the corporation.[35] Lao was only a minor employee who had nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of checks.[36] In contrast, petitioner was the proprietor of Dyna Marketing and the sole signatory of the checks who received notice of their dishonor. | |||||
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2008-06-19 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer had received this notice, and that within five banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.[26] The full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense.[27] Accordingly, procedural due process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.[28] | |||||
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2008-04-23 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The presumption is not conclusive,[23] however, as it may be rebutted by full payment.[24] If the maker or drawer pays, or makes arrangement with the drawee bank for the payment of the amount due within the five-day period from notice of the dishonor, he or she may no longer be indicted for such violation.[25] It is a complete defense[26] that would lie regardless of the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution.[27] In essence, the law affords the drawer or maker the opportunity to avert prosecution by performing some acts that would operate to preempt the criminal action,[28] which opportunity serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application.[29] | |||||
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2005-05-26 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, maintains that the petitioner was notified verbally and in writing of the dishonor of the subject checks, as shown by the aforementioned telegram sent by Caltex via PT&T to INSURECO. The OSG argues that the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the said telegram since she was the assigned finance officer of INSURECO. The petitioner even failed to prove that March 31, 1992 was the last day of her employment with INSURECO; and even if it were the case, it was unusual that the petitioner still signed checks due and demandable at a time when she would no longer be connected with INSURECO, and that the latter allowed such a situation. The OSG posits that the petitioner cannot even rely on the ruling of this Court in Lao v. Court of Appeals,[33] because the factual backdrop in this case is substantially different. | |||||
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2005-01-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Petitioner also points out that in Lao vs. Court of Appeals[28] the Court held that if knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held liable for the offense defined under Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22; in said case, petitioner was acquitted, even though she was still connected with the corporation at the time of the issuance of the check, since she was not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the corporation, knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; and that in the case at bar, the court a quo affirmed the conviction of petitioner even though it was established that he had ceased to be connected with co-accused Bautista's business for more than three years prior to the issuance of the subject check and even though it was clear from the testimony of private complainant himself that he had dealt with Bautista and Ilagan only.[29] | |||||
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2005-01-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As a rule, the prosecution has a duty to prove all the elements of the crime, including the acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption. Petitioner, on the other hand, has a right to rebut such presumption. Thus, if such knowledge of insufficiency of funds is proven to be actually absent or inexistent, the accused should not be held liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22,[39] thus:SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. | |||||
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2001-10-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of Appeals,[11] may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters.[12] The prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters demanding payment which were purportedly sent to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioner's actual receipt of any demand letter which could have served as notice to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication that they were actually received by petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt nor return card for the first and second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is fatal to its cause. | |||||
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2001-10-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Even more crucial, the absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is a violation of the petitioner's right to due process. This is in effect our ruling in Lao vs. Court of Appeals,[18] where we held: It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator "a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated". This was also compared "to certain laws"(citing E.O. 107, 83 O.G. No. 7, p. 576 (February 16, 1987), and E.O. 122, 89 O.G. No. 44, p. 6349 (November 1, 1993) allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability" (citing Nitafan, David G., Notes and Comments on the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22), pp. 121-122). In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense" (citing Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639). The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.) | |||||