This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-12-08 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel fuel. Unlike in Francisco, where the Court had no reference to ascertain the price of the stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator, where the Court refused to take judicial notice of the selling price of lumber and/or narra for "lack of independent and competent source" of the necessary information at the time of the commission of the theft, the value of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be considered as a matter of public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice.[49] To note, "judicial [notice], which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace[s] evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve."[50] | |||||
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2010-09-29 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| We find no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining such award. In People v. Martinez,[47] this Court ruled that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because these are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration. Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve. Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration.[48] Here, what is involved are common goods for everyday use and ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores like private complainant's store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor and cigarettes. The RTC was thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of P10,000.00 as computed by the private complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store. | |||||
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2007-01-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.[29] | |||||
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2003-04-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Furthermore, it is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their attackers and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victim's minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.[15] Likewise, appellant failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were prompted by any ill motive to falsely testify or wrongfully accuse him of so grave a crime. In the absence of any evidence to show that the witness was actuated by any improper motive, his identification of the appellant as the author of the crime shall be given full faith and credit.[16] | |||||
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2001-11-15 |
PARDO, J. |
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| It is doctrinally settled that in the absence of evidence showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, their identification of the accused as the culprit shall be given full faith and credit.[28] The matter of evaluating the credibility of witnesses depends largely on the assessment of the trial court. Appellate courts rely heavily on the weight given by the trial court on the credibility of a witness as it had a first-hand opportunity to hear and see the witness testify.[29] | |||||