This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2010-07-22 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In a last ditch effort to save her case, petitioner posits for the first time on appeal that the supervisory function of BEO II is less than her former position. However, as correctly observed by the DBP and CSC, petitioner never assailed the reduction in the scope of her duties and responsibilities arising from her appointment as BEO II in the proceedings below. Instead, she limited her claim of demotion on the alleged decrease of her salary grade from 25 to 24 which, as stated earlier, has no legal and factual bases to stand on. Well-settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower tribunal will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[27] Besides, even if we were to relax this rule, petitioner proffered no evidence to establish the extent of the alleged reduction of her duties and responsibilities other than her self-serving allegations. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted before the CA that she continued to exercise supervisory functions over bank personnel after she was appointed as BEO II.[28] She further claimed that in 1993 she was assigned to head a unit where she exercised supervisory functions over more than 20 bank personnel.[29] Thus, we uphold the findings of the CA that petitioner's duties and responsibilities after the reorganization remained substantially the same. | |||||
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2009-04-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The argument lacks merit. While previously arguing that the rational basis test was not satisfied, petitioner now asserts that this test does not apply in this case and that the proper matrix to evaluate the constitutionality of the assailed law is the prohibition on unfair competition under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution. It should be noted that during the trial below, petitioner did not invoke said constitutional provision as it relied solely on the alleged violation of the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses. Well-settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[13] At any rate, even if we were to relax this rule, as previously stated, the evidence presented before the trial court is insufficient to establish the alleged violation of the constitutional proscription against unfair competition. | |||||
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2009-03-04 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| This issue is being raised for the first time on appeal. True, in Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc., the Court explained that Section 1 of R.A. No. 1162, as amended by R.A. No. 3516, authorizes the expropriation of any piece of land in the City of Manila, Quezon City and suburbs which have been and are actually being leased to tenants for at least 10 years, provided said lands have at least 40 families of tenants thereon.[19] Prior to and pending the expropriation, the tenant shall have a right of first refusal or preferential right to buy the leased premises should the landowner sell the same. However, compliance with the conditions for the application of the aforesaid law as well as the qualifications of the heirs of Orlando to be beneficiaries thereunder were never raised before the trial court, or even the Court of Appeals, because petitioner solely anchored its claim of ownership over the subject lot on the alleged violation of the prohibitory clause in the lease contract between Cornelio and Orlando, and the alleged non-performance of the right of first refusal given by Cornelio to Orlando. The rule is settled, impelled by basic requirements of due process, that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[20] As the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1162, as amended, was neither averred in the pleadings nor raised during the trial below, the same cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. | |||||
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2009-02-13 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Mendoza v. Court of Appeals[33] forecloses any doubt that an acceleration clause is valid and produces legal effects. In fact, in Selegna Management and Development Corporation v. United Coconut Planters Bank,[34] we held that:Considering that the contract is the law between the parties, respondent is justified in invoking the acceleration clause declaring the entire obligation immediately due and payable. That clause obliged petitioners to pay the entire loan on January 29, 1999, the date fixed by respondent. | |||||
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2006-06-16 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Settled is the rule that no questions will be entertained on appeal unless they have been raised below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule.[18] | |||||
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2003-09-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The argument is not well-taken. Ordinarily, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[33] | |||||
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2003-02-14 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "Prior to the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 18, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies to the case at bench, provides that a party in default shall not be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings or to take part in the proceedings (Manlayaon vs. Sunga, 208 SCRA 436). The lower court, therefore, neither gravely abused its discretion nor committed an error when the belatedly filed Answer was expunged from the records."[19] Doctrinally settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.[20] "Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule."[21] | |||||