Lawyerly

AM No. RTJ-12-2331

2012-12-10

MARCELINO A. MAGDADARO v. JUDGE BIENVENIDO R. SANIEL

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[15]

AM No. MTJ-11-1796

2012-06-13

FE D. VALDEZ v. JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[20]

AM No. MTJ-08-1719*

2010-11-23

ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES v. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES

PER CURIAM

Respondent judge's actuation is quite contrary to the rationale of the Rules on Summary Procedure which was promulgated particularly for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases."[30] It is not encouraging when it is the judge herself who occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule.[31] Her lackadaisical attitude in sitting on the subject cases for years as well as her failure to immediately render judgment in Civil Case No. 19887 after the defendants therein failed to file their answer, clearly manifested her utter disregard of settled rules and jurisprudence relative to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, to the detriment and prejudice of the complainants. Verily, respondent judge showed gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[32]

AM No. 09-9-163-MTC

2010-05-06

RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR BEFORE TERESITO A. ANDOY

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the court's business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.[4]

AM NO. MTJ-07-1685

2007-09-03

GIDEON B. JUSON v. JUDGE VICENTE C. MONDRAGON

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[12]

AM NO. RTJ-07-2057

2007-08-07

ROSALINA GALANZA v. JUDGE HENRY J. TROCINO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[16]

AM NO. MTJ-06-1653

2007-07-30

EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALEZ v. JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[8]

AM No. MTJ-07-1662

2007-06-08

AURORA E. BALAJEDEONG v. JUDGE DEOGRACIAS K. DEL ROSARIO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[6]

AM NO. RTJ-05-1941

2006-04-25

OCA v. JUDGE LOURDES M. GARCIA-BLANCO

GARCIA, J.

Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.[9] The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.[10]

AM NO. RTJ-05-1914 .

2005-09-30

OCA v. JUDGE NAPOLEON V. DILAG

PUNO, J.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the court's business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the ninety-day period is mandatory.[23]

AM NO. MTJ-05-1583

2005-03-11

MANUEL B. ARCENAS v. JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[8]

GR No. 140058

2002-08-01

MABAYO FARMS v. CA

QUISUMBING, J.

by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.[11] Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.[12] It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.[13] Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.[14] Second, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it observed that petitioner should have impleaded private respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. 6695 pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15]

GR No. 140058

2002-08-01

MABAYO FARMS v. CA

QUISUMBING, J.

by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.[11] Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.[12] It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.[13] Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.[14] Second, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it observed that petitioner should have impleaded private respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. 6695 pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15]

	AM No. RTJ-12-2331 2012-12-10	MARCELINO A. MAGDADARO v. JUDGE BIENVENIDO R. SANIEL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[15]
	AM No. MTJ-11-1796 2012-06-13	FE D. VALDEZ v. JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[20]
	AM No. MTJ-08-1719* 2010-11-23	ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES v. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES PER CURIAM
Respondent judge's actuation is quite contrary to the rationale of the Rules on Summary Procedure which was promulgated particularly for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases."[30] It is not encouraging when it is the judge herself who occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule.[31] Her lackadaisical attitude in sitting on the subject cases for years as well as her failure to immediately render judgment in Civil Case No. 19887 after the defendants therein failed to file their answer, clearly manifested her utter disregard of settled rules and jurisprudence relative to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, to the detriment and prejudice of the complainants. Verily, respondent judge showed gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[32]
	AM No. 09-9-163-MTC 2010-05-06	RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR BEFORE TERESITO A. ANDOY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the court's business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.[4]
	AM NO. MTJ-07-1685 2007-09-03	GIDEON B. JUSON v. JUDGE VICENTE C. MONDRAGON CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[12]
	AM NO. RTJ-07-2057 2007-08-07	ROSALINA GALANZA v. JUDGE HENRY J. TROCINO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[16]
	AM NO. MTJ-06-1653 2007-07-30	EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALEZ v. JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[8]
	AM No. MTJ-07-1662 2007-06-08	AURORA E. BALAJEDEONG v. JUDGE DEOGRACIAS K. DEL ROSARIO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[6]
	AM NO. RTJ-05-1941 2006-04-25	OCA v. JUDGE LOURDES M. GARCIA-BLANCO GARCIA, J.
Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.[9] The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.[10]
	AM NO. RTJ-05-1914 . 2005-09-30	OCA v. JUDGE NAPOLEON V. DILAG PUNO, J.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the court's business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the ninety-day period is mandatory.[23]
	AM NO. MTJ-05-1583 2005-03-11	MANUEL B. ARCENAS v. JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[8]
	GR No. 140058 2002-08-01	MABAYO FARMS v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.[11] Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.[12] It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.[13] Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.[14] Second, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it observed that petitioner should have impleaded private respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. 6695 pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15]
	GR No. 140058 2002-08-01	MABAYO FARMS v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.[11] Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.[12] It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.[13] Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.[14] Second, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it observed that petitioner should have impleaded private respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. 6695 pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15]

VICTORIA G. GACHON v. NORBERTO C. DEVERA