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EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. NLRC

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 167622 2011-01-25	GREGORIO V. TONGKO v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. BRION, J.
Even de Dios' letter is not determinative of control as it indicates the least amount of intrusion into Tongko's exercise of his role as manager in guiding the sales agents. Strictly viewed, de Dios' directives are merely operational guidelines on how Tongko could align his operations with Manulife's re-directed goal of being a "big league player." The method is to expand coverage through the use of more agents. This requirement for the recruitment of more agents is not a means-and-method control as it relates, more than anything else, and is directly relevant, to Manulife's objective of expanded business operations through the use of a bigger sales force whose members are all on a principal-agent relationship. An important point to note here is that Tongko was not supervising regular full-time employees of Manulife engaged in the running of the insurance business; Tongko was effectively guiding his corps of sales agents, who are bound to Manulife through the same agreement that he had with manulife, all the while sharing in these agents' commissions through his overrides.[21]
	GR No. 169173 2009-06-05	M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD M. ENRIQUEZ PUNO, C.J.
The second requisite of terminating an employee for loss of trust and confidence is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.[38] To be a valid cause for dismissal, the loss of confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.[39]
	GR No. 167449 2008-12-17	BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB v. RICHARD NIXON A. BABAN REYES, R.T., J.
The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.[19] Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary.[20]
	GR NO. 164772 2006-06-08	EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. RICARDO SADAC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Proceeding therefrom, we make a determination of whether the Court in Equitable Banking Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[73] G.R. No. 102467, dated 13 June 1997, awarded attorney's fees to respondent Sadac. In recapitulation, the dispositive portion of the aforesaid Decision is hereunder quoted:
	GR No. 158606 2004-03-09	BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. JOSEPHINE FIANZA YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
After careful deliberation, we note that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already ruled on most of the foregoing factual contentions, and that their findings are not tainted with arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion, but are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to be adequate in justifying a conclusion."[34]
	GR Nos. 148056-61 2003-10-08	PEOPLE v. JOSE DE CASTRO PER CURIAM
Jenny de Castro, fifteen (15) years old, twin sister of Jean, also narrated that the appellant sexually abused her on two (2) occasions, i.e., on 5 June 1998 and 24 March 1999. As to the rape incident of 5 June 1998,[10] she recalled that at about noon of the same day she was alone with her father in the house when the latter removed her clothes. After the appellant took off his clothes, he inserted his penis into her vagina. Jenny shouted for help but nobody heard her cry. By her own account, the appellant once again victimized her in the afternoon of 24 March 1999 in the sala of their house.[11] In answer to the query on what her reaction was to her father's molestations, she said she pushed him.[12] Jenny confirmed that she was impregnated by her father and gave birth to a baby girl on 3 November 1999.
	GR No. 137718 2000-01-28	REYNALDO O. MALONZO v. RONALDO B. ZAMORA DE LEON, JR., J.
First. Respondents aver that in their Consolidated Answer which petitioners filed before the OP[4], petitioners admitted that the sum of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 was included in the P50,000,000.00 denominated in a general manner as "Expropriation of Properties" and classified under "Current Operating Expenditures" in the 1998 Budget of Caloocan City. Petitioners however allegedly only took a different position in their pleadings on appeal and during the oral argument before the Court as they clarified that the sum of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246 Series of 1997 is separate and distinct from and not part of the sum of P50,000,000.00 categorized as "Current Operating Expenditures" in the 1998 Budget of Caloocan City. Respondents insist that petitioners may not change their theory for the first time on appeal since their admissions before the OP bind them, and to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.