This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2012-06-27 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| "An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor."[20] As earlier discussed, all these requisites have been fulfilled in the present case. | |||||
|
2010-11-17 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Crystal clear from the above provision is that the lease is on a month-to-month basis. Relevantly, the well-entrenched principle is that a lease from month-to-month is with a definite period and expires at the end of each month upon the demand to vacate by the lessor.[70] As held by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Amended Decision, the above-mentioned lease contract was duly terminated by DBP by virtue of its letter dated June 18, 1987. We reiterate that the letter explicitly directed the petitioners to come to the office of the DBP if they wished to enter into a new lease agreement with the said bank. Otherwise, if no contract of lease was executed within 30 days from the date of the letter, petitioners were to be considered uninterested in entering into a new contract and were thereby ordered to vacate the property. As no new contract was in fact executed between petitioners and DBP within the 30-day period, the directive to vacate, thus, took effect. DBP's letter dated June 18, 1987, therefore, constituted the written notice that was required to terminate the lease agreement between petitioners and Rudy Robles. From then on, the petitioners' continued possession of the subject property could be deemed to be without the consent of DBP. | |||||
|
2001-04-19 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
||||
| Notwithstanding the preceding discussion drawing to the conclusion that petitioner earned a score in his last argument, the power of the courts to establish a grace period pursuant to Art. 1687 is potestative or discretionary, to be exercised or not depending on the particular circumstances of the case: a longer term to be granted where equities come into play demanding extension, to be denied where none appears, always with due deference to the parties' freedom to contract.[23] Here, even as this Court has the discretion to fix a longer term for the lease, we find that petitioner's continuing possession as lessee of the premises from the supposed expiration of the lease on 31 March 1996 up to the present, or for a period now of more than five (5) years, suffices as an extension of the period. There is no longer need to extend it any further.[24] | |||||