This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2016-01-27 |
REYES, J. |
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| Nonetheless, the OSG also pointed out that it specifically requested the RTC to likewise furnish its deputized counsel with a copy of its notices. Records show that the deputized counsel also requested that copies of notices and pleadings be furnished to him.[33] Despite these requests, it was only the OSG that the RTC furnished with copies of its notices. It would have been more prudent for the RTC to have furnished the deputized counsel of its notices. All the same, doing so does not necessarily clear the OSG from its obligation to oversee the efficient handling of the case. And even if the deputized counsel was served with copies of the court's notices, orders and decisions, these will not be binding until they are actually received by the OSG. More so in this case where the OSG's Notice of Appearance and its Letter deputizing the LRA even contained the caveat that it is only notices of orders, resolutions and decisions served on the OSG that will bind the Republic, the entity, agency and/or official represented.[34] In fact, the proper basis for computing a reglementary period and for determining whether a decision had attained finality is service on the OSG.[35] As was stated in National Power Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:[36] | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| National Power Corporation v. NLRC,[59] as cited by the petitioner insofar as the rule on mandatory service of orders and decisions to the OSG is concerned, cannot be applied to the present case. In the said case, the OSG entered its appearance as counsel for National Power Corporation at the first instance. The deputization of Atty. Restituto O. Mallo was made only after the entry of appearance of the OSG, thus, making it the primary counsel of record. The appearance of the deputized special attorney in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter did not divest the OSG of control over the case and did not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of record. Ad contrarium, in the present case, the NAPOCOR lawyers had been the counsels of record from the very beginning of the case, and the OSG never made any formal entry of appearance. | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings.[19] In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[20] | |||||