This case has been cited 13 times or more.
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2006-02-22 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| [69] People v. Rios, 389 Phil. 338, 348 (2000). | |||||
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2004-03-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| After considering carefully the evidence on record, we find appellant's arguments unavailing. First, nowhere in the record is there a showing that the illumination at the situs criminis was so poor at the time of the incident sufficient to raise doubt on the positive identification by the eyewitness of the appellant as the assailant. Second, appellant himself admitted that Dadis and he lived as neighbors and they knew each other since childhood.[27] Appellant's physical features, build, and movements were familiar to the witness, Dadis. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to identify the person.[28] Third, on cross-examination, appellant admitted that there was no bad blood between Dadis and him. Thus, he did not know any reason or motive why Dadis should testify falsely against him.[29] As held in previous cases, where the conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness appears to be unbiased against the man on the dock, his statements as to the identity of the assailant deserve full faith and credence.[30] | |||||
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2004-01-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Over the span of time that the parties hereto had been living in the same town, they have become acquainted with each other's faces. In the rural areas, people tend to be more familiar with their town mates. As a rule, familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to identify the person.[55] It was precisely this familiarity with the faces of the appellants that led Catalina to positively identify them as the malefactors. | |||||
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2003-09-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We note that at the heart of the prosecution's case is the familiarity of Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis with appellant. Absent this familiarity, the prosecution's theory that circumstantial evidence shows that appellant killed Nemesio would collapse like a house of cards. It was precisely this familiarity with appellant, which enabled said witnesses to recognize him as the person tucking a gun in his waistband and walking away from the fallen victim. Bayanes had known appellant for some ten (10) years before the incident and even described him as a "good man."[73] She was only five or six meters away from the scene of the crime and was able to fully look at the face of the person tucking a gun in his pants and walking away. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to identify the person.[74] That the only illumination in the area came from the taillight of a parked vehicle and the lights on the roof of the bagsakan does not discredit her account. We have held that moonlight,[75] starlight,[76] kerosene lamps,[77] a flashlight,[78] and lights of passing vehicles[79] may be adequate to provide illumination sufficient for purposes of recognition and identification. Under the circumstances of these cases, this Court believes that Bayanes was in the position and had a fair opportunity to identify appellant as the person leaving the crime scene with a gun tucked in his waist. | |||||
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2002-08-06 |
PUNO, J. |
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| which resulted in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.[19] Circumstances qualifying criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence.[20] In the case at bar, no evidence was presented that the victim was sleeping when the accused stabbed him. | |||||
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2002-07-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Davila Street, Navotas. Her testimony is thus materially corroborated by the autopsy conducted on the deceased. It having been established that the victim died from multiple stab wounds, the failure of Mrs. Bates to identify or describe the weapon used is of no consequence and cannot diminish her credibility.[14] For one, witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall. For another, what is vital in her testimony is not her knowledge of the weapon used, but that she saw appellant stabbing the victim. The presentation of the murder weapon is not indispensable to the prosecution of an accused.[15] The non-identification or non-presentation of the weapon used is not fatal to the prosecution's cause where the accused was positively identified.[16] Second, appellant assails Mrs. Bates' claim that the incident occurred at the dead end of the alley where her son was sleeping and that she saw appellant immediately leave the crime scene. He points out that if her story were true, he should, by force of | |||||
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2001-08-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The trial court awarded actual damages in the amount of P57,245.00. However, only the amount of P10,000.00 for embalming services was duly receipted. It is axiomatic that a party seeking the award of actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized by the court. It will not rely merely on suppositions or conjectures.[11] Thus, the amount of actual damages is reduced to P10,000.00. | |||||
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2001-05-24 |
BUENA, J. |
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| The trial court ruled that the crime committed was murder after finding that the killings were attended by treachery, evident premeditation, dwelling and price or reward. Only one aggravating circumstance is enough to qualify the killing to murder, the rest constitute generic aggravating circumstances. We agree with the trial court that treachery was proven since the "attack was sudden, unexpected, without warning, and without giving the victims an opportunity to defend themselves or repel the aggression, as in fact the deceased did not sense any danger that they would be shot by the assailants as there was no grudge and misunderstanding between them."[19] Dwelling is also aggravating considering that the assailants were in the sanctity of their own home - which is perhaps the last bulwark of their safety. An unsuspecting knock on the door betrayed that trust of peace in the family who were only conversing. Dwelling, or morada, is aggravating when crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party[20] and the latter has not given provocation.[21] Provocation in dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime.[22] No such provocation concurs herein. With respect to evident premeditation, the hiring of Tiguman to kill the victims for a price, providing the victims' picture and the meeting to carry out the killing provide more than sufficient evidence to appreciate the same. As to the circumstance of price or reward, it can only be appreciated against appellant Tiguman since it was he who committed the felonious act for money. The same evidence on price established conspiracy between the appellants. Consequently the act of one is the act of all.[23] | |||||
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2001-05-24 |
BUENA, J. |
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| With respect to the monetary awards, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded to each of the heirs of the two victims, as well as the additional P50,000.00 as moral damages each, are proper. The civil indemnity is automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in the case of death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime and the accused-appellants' culpability therefor.[27] On the actual damages of P150,000.00 awarded by the court a quo, the same lack evidentiary basis on the records.[28] No receipt or any document was presented in support thereof. Nonetheless, the amount of P15,000.00 as temperate damages would suffice in lieu of the unproven burial expenses.[29] In addition to such monetary awards, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages should have also been granted considering the presence of aggravating circumstances.[30] | |||||
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2000-10-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Concerning damages, the trial court awarded "P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P15,000.00 for burial expenses and compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as attorney fees and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses and to pay the costs."[40] We find, however, that in awarding actual damages, the court a quo relied only on the testimony of Edna Ho Galindo as regarding expenses incurred for the wake and burial of the victim.[41] No receipts were presented to support her claims. But in this regard, courts will recognize only substantiated expenses, which have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim.[42] Thus, the award of "P15,000.00 for burial expenses and compensatory damages" ought to be deleted, for being unsupported by the sufficient evidence. But the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling warrants the imposition of exemplary damages.[43] Such award is within the Court's discretion, as part of the civil liability that may be imposed upon the appellant.[44] | |||||
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2000-09-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| We disagree with the trial court's finding, however, that treachery attended the killing of Teresita. Treachery exists when the following facts are shown: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[54] Moreover, this Court has previously held that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Absent any particulars on the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.[55] Florencio testified that Teresita Navarro walked four meters behind him. Florencio did not therefore witness the manner his wife was attacked by accused Albacin. He looked back to his wife only after he heard the fatal gunshot and saw Teresita already fallen. There is a dearth of evidence whether Teresita had no opportunity to defend herself or to retaliate, nor on whether the means of execution was consciously adopted even assuming arguendo that the attack was sudden.[56] | |||||
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2000-08-15 |
PUNO, J. |
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| must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the court to exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence.[64] safeguards designed to reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate, the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of capital punishment[65] for an erroneous conviction "will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice."[66] the accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' essence." This, the accused can do only if he is apprised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to takeaway life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him. In a series of cases under the regime of Rep. Act No. 7659, the Court did not appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which would have increased the imposable penalty to death when such circumstance was not alleged in the information.[67] In | |||||
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2000-08-01 |
PUNO, J. |
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| himself or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[51] It is also the running case law that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Without any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.[52] In the case at bar, prosecution witness Cruz testified on what transpired immediately after the killing of the victim. He had no knowledge of the circumstances before the shooting and the shooting itself. There is therefore no proof that the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Nor is there any evidence to show that the victim was unarmed. Even assuming arguendo that the attack is sudden, there is no evidence that the means of execution was deliberately adopted.[53] The finding of the trial court that the accused shot the victim several times does not find support from the evidence on record. Evident premeditation cannot likewise be appreciated. There is evident premeditation when the following facts are proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to his determination to commit the crime; and | |||||