Lawyerly

GR NOS. 178085 - 178086

2015-09-14

UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPTION v. OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF LABOR

JARDELEZA, J.

The leading case explaining what is a "position of trust and confidence" is Mabeza v. NLRC,[58] where we held that: [L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To (he first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. ...[59]

GR No. 160982

2013-06-26

MANILA JOCKEY CLUB v. AIMEE O. TRAJANO

BERSAMIN, J.

In this regard, we have to stress that the loss of trust and confidence as a ground for the dismissal of an employee must also be shown to be genuine, for, as the Court has aptly pointed out in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission:[33] " x x x loss of confidence should not be simulated in order to justify what would otherwise be, under the provisions of law, an illegal dismissal. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith."

GR No. 176184

2012-06-13

ROMEO E. PAULINO v. NLRC

SERENO, J.

Willful breach of trust or loss of confidence requires that the employee (1) occupied a position of trust or (2) was routinely charged with the care of the employer's property.[23] As correctly appreciated by the CA, petitioner was charged with the care and custody of PLDT's property.

GR No. 192473

2010-10-11

S.I.P. FOOD HOUSE v. RESTITUTO BATOLINA

BRION, J.

We likewise affirm the CA ruling on the monetary award to Batolina and the other complainants. The free board and lodging SIP furnished the employees cannot operate as a set-off for the underpayment of their wages. We held in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission[15] that the employer cannot simply deduct from the employee's wages the value of the board and lodging without satisfying the following requirements: (1) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (2) voluntary acceptance in writing by the employees of the deductible facilities; and (3) proof of the fair and reasonable value of the facilities charged. As the CA aptly noted, it is clear from the records that SIP failed to comply with these requirements.

GR NO. 178976

2009-07-31

ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

There are two classes of positions of trust.[22] The first class consists of managerial employees. They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions.[23] The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc.. They are defined as those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[24]

GR No. 169173

2009-06-05

M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD M. ENRIQUEZ

PUNO, C.J.

The second class or fiduciary rank-and-file employees consist of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[34] These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.

GR No. 167449

2008-12-17

BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB v. RICHARD NIXON A. BABAN

REYES, R.T., J.

There are two (2) classes of positions of trust.[10] The first class consists of managerial employees.[11] They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions.[12] The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc.[13] They are defined as those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[14]

GR No. 172306

2008-09-29

MICHAEL V. SANTOS v. SHING HUNG PLASTICS

CARPIO MORALES, J.

x x x [L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and [to] the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

GR No. 164824

2008-04-30

ROLANDO V. AROMIN v. NLRC

VELASCO JR., J.

As we held in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission,[19] loss of confidence, as a ground for dismissal, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or of trust and confidence. As such, the employee must be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care of the employer's money and other assets. We further held in Mabeza:Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was never intended to provide employers with a blank check for terminating their employees. Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of confidence, if unqualifiedly given the seal of approval by this Court, could readily reduce to barren form the words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Having this in mind, loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies [effect personnel movements] x x x or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[20] (Emphasis ours.)

GR NO. 157634

2005-05-16

MAYON HOTEL v. ROLANDO ADANA

PUNO, J.

Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC,[87] the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The records are clear that petitioners failed to comply with these requirements. There was no proof of respondents' written authorization. Indeed, the Labor Arbiter found that while the respondents admitted that they were given meals and merienda, the quality of food served to them was not what was provided for in the Facility Evaluation Orders and it was only when they filed the cases that they came to know of this supposed Facility Evaluation Orders.[88] Petitioner Josefa Po Lam herself admitted that she did not inform the respondents of the facilities she had applied for.[89]

	GR NOS. 178085 - 178086 2015-09-14	UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPTION v. OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF LABOR JARDELEZA, J.
The leading case explaining what is a "position of trust and confidence" is Mabeza v. NLRC,[58] where we held that: [L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To (he first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. ...[59]
	GR No. 160982 2013-06-26	MANILA JOCKEY CLUB v. AIMEE O. TRAJANO BERSAMIN, J.
In this regard, we have to stress that the loss of trust and confidence as a ground for the dismissal of an employee must also be shown to be genuine, for, as the Court has aptly pointed out in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission:[33] " x x x loss of confidence should not be simulated in order to justify what would otherwise be, under the provisions of law, an illegal dismissal. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith."
	GR No. 176184 2012-06-13	ROMEO E. PAULINO v. NLRC SERENO, J.
Willful breach of trust or loss of confidence requires that the employee (1) occupied a position of trust or (2) was routinely charged with the care of the employer's property.[23] As correctly appreciated by the CA, petitioner was charged with the care and custody of PLDT's property.
	GR No. 192473 2010-10-11	S.I.P. FOOD HOUSE v. RESTITUTO BATOLINA BRION, J.
We likewise affirm the CA ruling on the monetary award to Batolina and the other complainants. The free board and lodging SIP furnished the employees cannot operate as a set-off for the underpayment of their wages. We held in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission[15] that the employer cannot simply deduct from the employee's wages the value of the board and lodging without satisfying the following requirements: (1) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (2) voluntary acceptance in writing by the employees of the deductible facilities; and (3) proof of the fair and reasonable value of the facilities charged. As the CA aptly noted, it is clear from the records that SIP failed to comply with these requirements.
	GR NO. 178976 2009-07-31	ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION CARPIO MORALES, J.
There are two classes of positions of trust.[22] The first class consists of managerial employees. They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions.[23] The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc.. They are defined as those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[24]
	GR No. 169173 2009-06-05	M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD M. ENRIQUEZ PUNO, C.J.
The second class or fiduciary rank-and-file employees consist of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[34] These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.
	GR No. 167449 2008-12-17	BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB v. RICHARD NIXON A. BABAN REYES, R.T., J.
There are two (2) classes of positions of trust.[10] The first class consists of managerial employees.[11] They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions.[12] The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc.[13] They are defined as those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[14]
	GR No. 172306 2008-09-29	MICHAEL V. SANTOS v. SHING HUNG PLASTICS CARPIO MORALES, J.
x x x [L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and [to] the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
	GR No. 164824 2008-04-30	ROLANDO V. AROMIN v. NLRC VELASCO JR., J.
As we held in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission,[19] loss of confidence, as a ground for dismissal, is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or of trust and confidence. As such, the employee must be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care of the employer's money and other assets. We further held in Mabeza:Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was never intended to provide employers with a blank check for terminating their employees. Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of confidence, if unqualifiedly given the seal of approval by this Court, could readily reduce to barren form the words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Having this in mind, loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies [effect personnel movements] x x x or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.[20] (Emphasis ours.)
	GR NO. 157634 2005-05-16	MAYON HOTEL v. ROLANDO ADANA PUNO, J.
Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC,[87] the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The records are clear that petitioners failed to comply with these requirements. There was no proof of respondents' written authorization. Indeed, the Labor Arbiter found that while the respondents admitted that they were given meals and merienda, the quality of food served to them was not what was provided for in the Facility Evaluation Orders and it was only when they filed the cases that they came to know of this supposed Facility Evaluation Orders.[88] Petitioner Josefa Po Lam herself admitted that she did not inform the respondents of the facilities she had applied for.[89]

NORMA MABEZA v. NLRC