This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2012-07-11 |
SERENO, J. |
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| This exercise of discretion is not unbridled, however, especially when attended with grave abuse. Grave abuse of discretion denotes "abuse of discretion too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility."[15] It is present when there is capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary exercise of judgment, which in the eyes of the law amounts to lack of jurisdiction.[16] | |||||
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2012-04-18 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Petitioner has more than amply demonstrated that the RTC's issuance of the assailed orders dated 17 November 2003 and 31 May 2004 was attended with grave abuse of discretion. In the context of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[51] It has been ruled that the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[52] To our mind, the grave abuse of discretion imputable against the RTC was manifest as early in the assailed 17 November 2003 order where, without giving any rationale therefor, and while it upheld petitioner's right of expropriation over Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J, it excluded the area occupied by the Villa Marina Beach Resort owned and operated by respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. No less than the Constitution mandates that "(n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."[53] | |||||
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2005-04-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Accordingly, based only upon the foregoing considerations, it would appear that respondent NWRB was correct in dismissing petitioner's Opposition and/or Appeal because there is "nothing which can be the subject of an appeal" as there is nothing for respondent NWRB to decide considering the absence of water rights controversy.[16] [Emphasis Ours] Respondent's penchant for disregarding the rules of procedure is evident from the facts of the case. Both the NWRB and the trial court deduced that as early as 22 October 1992 or eight (8) months prior to the issuance of petitioner's water permits, respondent City of Iligan was already aware of Buendia's applications and had all the opportunity to protest the same but failed to do so and instead, filed it's opposition and/or appeal almost five months after the permits have been issued. Further, from receipt of the NWRB order denying its opposition and/or appeal, respondent did not file a Motion for Reconsideration but proceeded to file a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC after almost six (6) months from the issuance of said order. Certainly, filing said petition almost six (6) months later does not fall within what this Court considers as a reasonable period to institute a petition for certiorari. Although the applicable rules on special civil action for certiorari, at the time of the filing of the petition, did not provide for a definite time frame within which to file the petition,[17] this Court has ruled, as early as 20 January 1992 in a Resolution in PHILEC Workers' Union v. Hon. Romeo A. Young,[18] "that the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be filed within a reasonable period of only three (3) months."[19] | |||||