This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2015-07-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The CA's reliance on Lao v. Court of Appeals[26] was inappropriate. In Lao, the Court opined and declared that the petition to disqualify the trial judge must be filed prior to the rendition of judgment.[27] But the supposed disqualification of the judge in Lao was premised on bias as perceived by a party.[28] We should point out that perceived bias was a ground covered by the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37, supra, and would justify only the voluntary inhibition of the judge. In contrast, Judge Elumba's situation rested on a ground for mandatory disqualification because it emanated from the conclusive presumption of his bias.[29] Such a ground should have been forthwith acknowledged upon Judge Elumba's assumption of the judgeship in Branch 42, or, at the latest, upon the ground being raised to his attention, regardless of the stage of the case. | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| While it is settled that the mere fact that the fiscal took full control of litigation does not grant immunity to persons who misuse their rights to instigate criminal actions,[33] we cannot, however, discount the fact that from his layman's point of view, the prosecutor's act of filing an Information for Unjust Vexation against petitioner must have indeed bolstered Ricardo Cokieng's honest belief that he had a strong case against the former. Moreover, it is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.[34] | |||||