This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2008-10-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Regarding her extrajudicial confession, the plaintiff-appellee correctly adverted to the ruling in People v. Andan[19] as to the admissibility of the verbal confession made by the accused-appellant, which she made not only to Kagawad William Lim but also to Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in progress. Moreover, as correctly held by the CA, even if the written extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the evidence presented by the prosecution is more than sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. | |||||
|
2004-01-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| He said that what he did was just right, just justice.[50] The TV news reporters' testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser's killing. As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.[51] | |||||
|
2003-04-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellant's possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been freely and voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the appellant.[19] Thus, the duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an indefinite period as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by the prosecution, has no bearing on the culpability of the appellant. It does not matter whether the unlawful taking occurred within the period of the lease. What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point on which the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiterate, the prosecution was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused stabbed the victim to death because he refused to join them in their plan to appropriate the vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence, rendering appellant liable for the crime charged. | |||||