This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2007-01-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In A.C. Ransom, the corporate entity was a family corporation and execution against it could not be implemented because of the disposition post-haste of its leviable assets evidently in order to evade its just and due obligations. The doctrine of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" was thus clearly appropriate. Chua likewise involved another family corporation, and this time the conflict was between two brothers occupying the highest ranking positions in the company. There were incontrovertible facts which pointed to extreme personal animosity that resulted, evidently in bad faith, in the easing out from the company of one of the brothers by the other.[36] In the case of Naguiat v. National Labor Relations Commission,[37] the Court applied the doctrine found in the case of A. C. Ransom Labor Untion- CCLU v. National Labor Relations Commission. There was a cessation of the operations of the employer-corporation and, thus, a problem as to who shall pay the employees. In holding the president solidarily liable, the Court considered that he had actively engaged in the management and operations of the corporation. Nevertheless, it absolved from liability the vice-president, since no evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was proffered. | |||||
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2005-07-28 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Petitioner Kay Lee, as the president, actively managed the business of KPI. In fact, she was the one who decided the private respondents' transfer to the employment agencies, and signed the memoranda ordering such transfer, in bad faith, as earlier discussed. In labor cases, particularly, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of corporate employees done with malice or in bad faith.[30] In fact, in Naguiat v. NLRC,[31] the Court held that the president of a corporation, who actively manages the business, falls within the meaning of an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, and may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees. Thus, in the present case, petitioners Kay Lee and KPI are jointly and severally liable for the latter's obligations to the private respondents. | |||||
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2002-08-01 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| provides that appeal should be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.[17] But petitioner's claim rings hollow and false. On record, the registry return card for petitioner's copy of the trial court's decision shows that petitioner received a copy of the decision on September 15, 1995.[18] But as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner allowed thirty-two (32) days from receipt of notice of Decision dated August 10, 1995 to lapse before he filed a motion for reconsideration.[19] Petitioner lamely suggests that, assuming he received a copy of the decision, still he was not properly notified. Since he was represented by a counsel, he contends that it was the latter who should have been served the notice and the decision. Records show that from the start of the case, however, notices had always been served on petitioner and his spouse. He did not protest this manner of service during the pendency of proceedings before the trial court nor in his motion for reconsideration. At this late hour, it is our view that petitioner is now estopped from raising this issue for his failure to do so earlier.[20] Patently, the subsequent appeal taken by petitioner after denial of the motion for reconsideration by the trial court, is already beyond the 15-day reglementary period allowed for appeal. Worst, the decision of the lower court had long become final and executory at the time | |||||