This case has been cited 6 times or more.
|
2012-12-05 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| Petitioner's belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case or the cause of action on appeal. Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal or certiorari.[72] When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[73] Hence, a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.[74] | |||||
|
2010-08-08 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| The Court of Appeals held that the general rule is that after denial of a motion to dismiss, the defendant should file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal. The exception is when the court denying the motion to dismiss acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of.[10] The appellate court stated that the exception does not apply to this case, since RTC Judge Fantilanan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders in question. | |||||
|
2008-06-25 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| both parties.[62] A change of theory on appeal is not allowed.[63] In this case, the matter of petitioner's serious heart condition was not raised in his application before the SSS or in his June 19, 2000 petition before the SSC. | |||||
|
2005-03-11 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[25] A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.[26] | |||||
|
2003-06-25 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[35] | |||||
|
2000-02-17 |
PURISIMA, J. |
||||
| Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.[50] As thus defined, the fact of termination of the criminal prosecution, civil suit or legal proceeding maliciously filed and without probable cause, should precede the complaint for malicious prosecution. Such a complaint states a cause of action if it alleges: (a) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least instigated the prosecution; (b) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (c) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and (d) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives.[51] | |||||