This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2005-03-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. In support of her assertion, she cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections,[2] and Lomugdang v. Javier,[3] to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial court of the jurisdiction to decide the election contest. She stresses nevertheless that even if the instant protest case succeeds, she is cognizant that as a mere substitute she cannot succeed, assume or be entitled to said elective office, and her utmost concern is not personal but one that involves the public's interest. She prays, however, that if subsequently determined that the protestee Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did not get the highest number of votes for president, for protestee to be disallowed from remaining in office, and thus prevented from exercising the powers, duties, responsibilities and prerogatives reserved only to the duly-elected president or her legitimate successor. | |||||
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2005-03-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court.[8] This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death.[9] Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias,[10] we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, in the later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections,[11] we struck down the claim of the surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous cases before other electoral tribunals,[12] involving substitution by the widow of a deceased protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs. | |||||