Lawyerly

GR No. 171172

2015-11-09

BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. SPS. JOHNSON AND EVELYN CO AND JUPITER REAL ESTATE VENTURES

JARDELEZA, J.

In a Resolution dated January 9, 2012, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Spouses Co and Jupiter.[39] Only Spouses Co filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Motion to Consolidate this Petition (G.R. No. 200061) with G.R. No. 171172 dated February 8, 2012.[40] Spouses Co alleged that the cases of Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac, Jr.,[41] Bank of Commerce v. Perlas-Bernabe[42] Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[43] and Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court[44] should apply and the CA should have considered the peculiar circumstances of the case.[45] They claimed that there was then a petition for corporate rehabilitation pending with another court that issued a stay order.[46] Thus, the foreclosure was null and void.[47] Spouses Co further alleged that Act No. 3135 violates the Constitution since the law gives unbridled license to the court and purchaser to deprive the owner of the property without the opportunity to be heard.[48]

GR No. 179691

2013-12-04

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. MARY ANN O. YEUNG

BRION, J.

In its August 9, 2006 decision,[7] the CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the issuance of a writ of possession. It found that the P2,594,750.00 bid price far exceeded the P1,950,000.00 mortgage obligation. Relying on the Court's pronouncement in Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[8] the CA ruled that the petitioner's failure to remit the surplus from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale (equivalent to 33% of the mortgage debt) was a valid ground to defer the issuance of a writ of possession for reasons of equity. It reversed the RTC orders and ordered the petitioner to remit the excess from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to the respondent.

GR No. 176518

2010-03-02

PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY v. METROPOLITAN BANK

DEL CASTILLO, J.

As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption.[8] Section 7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose "in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law" with the Regional Trial Court of the province or place where the real property or any part thereof is situated, in the case of mortgages duly registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also directs in express terms the said court to issue the order for a writ of possession.[9]

GR Nos. 175728 & 178914

2009-05-08

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. PRIME NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION

TINGA, J.

It is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. The governing law, Act No. 3135, as amended, in Section 7 thereof, explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.[29] The writ of possession issues as a matter of course even without the filing and approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in the name of the purchaser.[30]

GR NO. 159882

2007-11-23

SPS. RUBEN AND VIOLETA SAGUAN v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS

NACHURA, J.

In their Opposition and Reply, petitioners argued that a writ of possession should not issue considering respondent's failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds[9] of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale based on our ruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals.[10] In refutation, respondent points to petitioners' remaining unsecured obligations with the former to which the excess or surplus proceeds were applied.

GR NO. 170215

2007-08-28

SPS. ESMERALDO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Based on the foregoing, after payment of the costs of suit and satisfaction of the claim of the first mortgagee/senior mortgagee, the claim of the second mortgagee/junior mortgagee may be satisfied from the surplus proceeds. The application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor's obligation is an act of payment, not payment by dacion; hence, it is the mortgagee's duty to return any surplus in the selling price to the mortgagor. Perforce, a mortgagee who exercises the power of sale contained in a mortgage is considered a custodian of the fund and, being bound to apply it properly, is liable to the persons entitled thereto if he fails to do so. And even though the mortgagee is not strictly considered a trustee in a purely equitable sense, but as far as concerns the unconsumed balance, the mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption.[30]

GR NOS. 140836 & 140907

2007-06-08

ILIGAN BAY MANUFACTURING CORP. v. HENRY DY

VELASCO, JR., J.

We have established in jurisprudence that in cases involving redemption, the law protects the original owner. It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the owner's right. Therefore, "redemption should be looked upon with favor and where no injury will follow, a liberal construction will be given to our redemption laws, specifically on the exercise of the right to redeem."[35] In Doronilla v. Vasquez, this Court allowed the redemption in certain cases even after the lapse of the one (1)- year period in order to promote justice. [36] This Court even went further in Delos Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, when the rule on redemption was liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property to give him another opportunity to recover his property, should his fortunes improve.[37] Finally, in Rosales v. Yboa, this Court held that:In fine, We hold that the failure of the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio to tender the amount of P745.47 representing the delinquent real estate taxes of the subject property, the registration fee of P3.00 and the interest thereon of P0.04, the Sheriff's Commission in the sum of P99.82, and the deficiency interest on the purchase price of the subject property, will not render the redemption in question null and void, it having been established that he has substantially complied with the requirements of the law to effect a valid redemption, with his tender of payment of the purchase price and the interest thereon within twelve (12) months from the date of the registration of the sale. This ruling is in obedience of the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. [38]

GR NO. 168088

2007-04-04

SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK v. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Respondents maintained that they had the right to redeem the property. Since there were grave doubts about the parties' contentions as to who had the right to possess the property, the RTC should have dismissed the petition for a writ of possession pending determination of the substantial issues by the LRA. The trial court should have relied on the rulings of this Court in Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad,[42] Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[43] and Sulit v. Court of Appeals.[44] Respondents asserted that petitioner was not entitled to a writ of possession because contrary to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, it posted a bond beyond the period for redemption. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75787.

GR NO. 154129

2005-08-08

TERESITA DIO v. SPS. VIRGILIO AND LUZ ROCES JAPOR AND MARTA JAPOR

QUISUMBING, J.

We note that the "surplus" was the result of the computation by the Court of Appeals of respondents' outstanding liability based on a reduced interest rate of 12% per annum and the reduced penalty rate of 1% per month. The court a quo then proceeded to apply our ruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[20] to the effect that in case of surplus in the purchase price, the mortgagee is liable for such surplus as actually comes into his hands, but where he sells on credit instead of cash, he must still account for the proceeds as if the price were paid in cash, for such surplus stands in the place of the land itself with respect to liens thereon or vested rights therein particularly those of the mortgagor or his assigns.

GR No. 154129

2005-07-08

TERESITA DIO v. SPS. VIRGILIO AND LUZ ROCES JAPOR AND MARTA JAPOR

QUISUMBING, J.

We note that the "surplus" was the result of the computation by the Court of Appeals of respondents' outstanding liability based on a reduced interest rate of 12% per annum and the reduced penalty rate of 1% per month. The court a quo then proceeded to apply our ruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[20] to the effect that in case of surplus in the purchase price, the mortgagee is liable for such surplus as actually comes into his hands, but where he sells on credit instead of cash, he must still account for the proceeds as if the price were paid in cash, for such surplus stands in the place of the land itself with respect to liens thereon or vested rights therein particularly those of the mortgagor or his assigns.

GR No. 158495

2004-10-21

ELIZABETH EUSEBIO-CALDERON v. PEOPLE

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.

However, while there can be no stipulated interest, there can be legal interest pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code.[18] It is elementary that in the absence of a stipulation as to interest, the loan due will now earn interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum.[19] In the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[20] we established the guidelines particularly for the award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof as follows:When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)

GR No. 114172

2003-08-25

JUANITA P. PINEDA v. CA

CARPIO, J.

What remained with Pineda and Sayoc after the foreclosure was the mortgagor's residual rights over the foreclosed Property, which rights are the equity of redemption[31] and a share in the surplus fund, if any.[32] Since Mojica was not a purchaser in good faith, the residual rights of Mojica were subject to the claim of Pineda and Sayoc. Of course, Pineda and Sayoc may still file an action to recover the outstanding debt of the Spouses Benitez, and even go after Mojica for her assumption of obligation under the Acknowledgment of Indebtedness.

	GR No. 171172 2015-11-09	BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. SPS. JOHNSON AND EVELYN CO AND JUPITER REAL ESTATE VENTURES JARDELEZA, J.
In a Resolution dated January 9, 2012, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Spouses Co and Jupiter.[39] Only Spouses Co filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Motion to Consolidate this Petition (G.R. No. 200061) with G.R. No. 171172 dated February 8, 2012.[40] Spouses Co alleged that the cases of Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac, Jr.,[41] Bank of Commerce v. Perlas-Bernabe[42] Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[43] and Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court[44] should apply and the CA should have considered the peculiar circumstances of the case.[45] They claimed that there was then a petition for corporate rehabilitation pending with another court that issued a stay order.[46] Thus, the foreclosure was null and void.[47] Spouses Co further alleged that Act No. 3135 violates the Constitution since the law gives unbridled license to the court and purchaser to deprive the owner of the property without the opportunity to be heard.[48]
	GR No. 179691 2013-12-04	PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. MARY ANN O. YEUNG BRION, J.
In its August 9, 2006 decision,[7] the CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the issuance of a writ of possession. It found that the P2,594,750.00 bid price far exceeded the P1,950,000.00 mortgage obligation. Relying on the Court's pronouncement in Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[8] the CA ruled that the petitioner's failure to remit the surplus from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale (equivalent to 33% of the mortgage debt) was a valid ground to defer the issuance of a writ of possession for reasons of equity. It reversed the RTC orders and ordered the petitioner to remit the excess from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to the respondent.
	GR No. 176518 2010-03-02	PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY v. METROPOLITAN BANK DEL CASTILLO, J.
As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption.[8] Section 7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose "in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law" with the Regional Trial Court of the province or place where the real property or any part thereof is situated, in the case of mortgages duly registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also directs in express terms the said court to issue the order for a writ of possession.[9]
	GR Nos. 175728 & 178914 2009-05-08	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. PRIME NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION TINGA, J.
It is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. The governing law, Act No. 3135, as amended, in Section 7 thereof, explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.[29] The writ of possession issues as a matter of course even without the filing and approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in the name of the purchaser.[30]
	GR NO. 159882 2007-11-23	SPS. RUBEN AND VIOLETA SAGUAN v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS NACHURA, J.
In their Opposition and Reply, petitioners argued that a writ of possession should not issue considering respondent's failure to return the excess or surplus proceeds[9] of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale based on our ruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals.[10] In refutation, respondent points to petitioners' remaining unsecured obligations with the former to which the excess or surplus proceeds were applied.
	GR NO. 170215 2007-08-28	SPS. ESMERALDO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Based on the foregoing, after payment of the costs of suit and satisfaction of the claim of the first mortgagee/senior mortgagee, the claim of the second mortgagee/junior mortgagee may be satisfied from the surplus proceeds. The application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor's obligation is an act of payment, not payment by dacion; hence, it is the mortgagee's duty to return any surplus in the selling price to the mortgagor. Perforce, a mortgagee who exercises the power of sale contained in a mortgage is considered a custodian of the fund and, being bound to apply it properly, is liable to the persons entitled thereto if he fails to do so. And even though the mortgagee is not strictly considered a trustee in a purely equitable sense, but as far as concerns the unconsumed balance, the mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption.[30]
	GR NOS. 140836 & 140907 2007-06-08	ILIGAN BAY MANUFACTURING CORP. v. HENRY DY VELASCO, JR., J.
We have established in jurisprudence that in cases involving redemption, the law protects the original owner. It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the owner's right. Therefore, "redemption should be looked upon with favor and where no injury will follow, a liberal construction will be given to our redemption laws, specifically on the exercise of the right to redeem."[35] In Doronilla v. Vasquez, this Court allowed the redemption in certain cases even after the lapse of the one (1)- year period in order to promote justice. [36] This Court even went further in Delos Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, when the rule on redemption was liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property to give him another opportunity to recover his property, should his fortunes improve.[37] Finally, in Rosales v. Yboa, this Court held that:In fine, We hold that the failure of the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio to tender the amount of P745.47 representing the delinquent real estate taxes of the subject property, the registration fee of P3.00 and the interest thereon of P0.04, the Sheriff's Commission in the sum of P99.82, and the deficiency interest on the purchase price of the subject property, will not render the redemption in question null and void, it having been established that he has substantially complied with the requirements of the law to effect a valid redemption, with his tender of payment of the purchase price and the interest thereon within twelve (12) months from the date of the registration of the sale. This ruling is in obedience of the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. [38]
	GR NO. 168088 2007-04-04	SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK v. PAMPANGA OMNIBUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION CALLEJO, SR., J.
Respondents maintained that they had the right to redeem the property. Since there were grave doubts about the parties' contentions as to who had the right to possess the property, the RTC should have dismissed the petition for a writ of possession pending determination of the substantial issues by the LRA. The trial court should have relied on the rulings of this Court in Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad,[42] Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[43] and Sulit v. Court of Appeals.[44] Respondents asserted that petitioner was not entitled to a writ of possession because contrary to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, it posted a bond beyond the period for redemption. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75787.
	GR NO. 154129 2005-08-08	TERESITA DIO v. SPS. VIRGILIO AND LUZ ROCES JAPOR AND MARTA JAPOR QUISUMBING, J.
We note that the "surplus" was the result of the computation by the Court of Appeals of respondents' outstanding liability based on a reduced interest rate of 12% per annum and the reduced penalty rate of 1% per month. The court a quo then proceeded to apply our ruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[20] to the effect that in case of surplus in the purchase price, the mortgagee is liable for such surplus as actually comes into his hands, but where he sells on credit instead of cash, he must still account for the proceeds as if the price were paid in cash, for such surplus stands in the place of the land itself with respect to liens thereon or vested rights therein particularly those of the mortgagor or his assigns.
	GR No. 154129 2005-07-08	TERESITA DIO v. SPS. VIRGILIO AND LUZ ROCES JAPOR AND MARTA JAPOR QUISUMBING, J.
We note that the "surplus" was the result of the computation by the Court of Appeals of respondents' outstanding liability based on a reduced interest rate of 12% per annum and the reduced penalty rate of 1% per month. The court a quo then proceeded to apply our ruling in Sulit v. Court of Appeals,[20] to the effect that in case of surplus in the purchase price, the mortgagee is liable for such surplus as actually comes into his hands, but where he sells on credit instead of cash, he must still account for the proceeds as if the price were paid in cash, for such surplus stands in the place of the land itself with respect to liens thereon or vested rights therein particularly those of the mortgagor or his assigns.
	GR No. 158495 2004-10-21	ELIZABETH EUSEBIO-CALDERON v. PEOPLE YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
However, while there can be no stipulated interest, there can be legal interest pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code.[18] It is elementary that in the absence of a stipulation as to interest, the loan due will now earn interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum.[19] In the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[20] we established the guidelines particularly for the award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof as follows:When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 114172 2003-08-25	JUANITA P. PINEDA v. CA CARPIO, J.
What remained with Pineda and Sayoc after the foreclosure was the mortgagor's residual rights over the foreclosed Property, which rights are the equity of redemption[31] and a share in the surplus fund, if any.[32] Since Mojica was not a purchaser in good faith, the residual rights of Mojica were subject to the claim of Pineda and Sayoc. Of course, Pineda and Sayoc may still file an action to recover the outstanding debt of the Spouses Benitez, and even go after Mojica for her assumption of obligation under the Acknowledgment of Indebtedness.

CESAR SULIT v. CA