This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2008-12-18 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Geronimo's thesis that the deed in question cannot be accorded prospective application is erroneous. To be sure, the provisions of the subject deed of suretyship indicate a continuing suretyship. In Fortune Motors (Phils.) v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court, citing cases, defined and upheld the validity of a continuing suretyship in this wise: "x x x Of course, a surety is not bound under any particular principal obligation until that principal obligation is born. But there is no theoretical or doctrinal difficulty inherent in saying that the suretyship agreement itself is valid and binding even before the principal obligation intended to be secured thereby is born, any more than there would be in saying that obligations which are subject to a condition precedent are valid and binding before the occurrence of the condition precedent. | |||||
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2003-08-07 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Similarly, there is no basis for petitioners to limit their responsibility thereon so long as they were corporate officers and stockholders of FBPC. Nothing in the Continuing Guaranty restricts their contractual undertaking to such condition or eventuality. In fact the obligations assumed by them therein subsist "upon the undersigned, the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the undersigned, and shall inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by you, your successors, transferees and assigns," and that their commitment "shall remain in full force and effect until written notice shall have been received by [the Bank] that it has been revoked by the undersigned." Verily, if petitioners intended not to be charged as sureties after their withdrawal from FBPC, they could have simply terminated the agreement by serving the required notice of revocation upon the Bank as expressly allowed therein.[47] In Garcia v. Court of Appeals[48] we ruled - | |||||