This case has been cited 7 times or more.
|
2011-08-24 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| Thus, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517,[68] as amended by P.D. No. 2016,[69] grants to qualified tenants of land in areas declared as urban land reform zones, the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at a reasonable price.[70] The same right is accorded by Republic Act No. 7279[71] (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) to qualified beneficiaries of socialized housing, with respect to the land they are occupying. Accordingly, in Valderama v. Macalde,[72] Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[73] and Conculada v. Court of Appeals,[74] the Supreme Court sustained the tenant's right of first refusal pursuant to P.D. 1517. | |||||
|
2006-10-23 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
||||
| This case originated from Civil Case No. 91-786, a complaint for breach of contract with damages filed by Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. (PKE) against the petitioners. In said case, respondent PKE asserted that as lessee of several parcels of land along Sucat Road in Parañaque City, it had the first option to buy the same lots from the latter, petitioner Catalina Santos, who had sold it to co-petitioner, David A. Raymundo.[4] The trial court presided by Acting Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda dismissed the complaint and upon appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal. Upon petition for certiorari filed with this Court, we reversed the order of dismissal in Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[5] We held that before the lessor (Catalina L. Santos), finally sold the property for PhP 9 million to a third person (David A. Raymundo), she should have offered it anew to the lessee (PKE) also for the same value. The Decision states: Santos again appeared to have violated the same provision of the lease contract when she finally resold the properties to respondent Raymundo for only P9 million without first offering them to petitioner at such price. Whether there was actual breach which entitled petitioner to damages and/or other just or equitable relief, is a question which can better be resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. After finding that PKE's complaint stated a valid cause of action, we remanded the case to the Makati City RTC for further proceedings. | |||||
|
2005-06-08 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| For their part, the respondents allege that, in arguing their cause, the petitioners thereby admitted that the instant complaint raised the factual or evidentiary issue of the consideration of the sale, and in effect, sustained the decision of the CA. They posit that the issue of the presence or absence of consideration is evidentiary, and should be threshed out in a full- blown trial. The respondents invoke the ruling of this Court in Alberto v. Court of Appeals,[19] where it was held that "a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action unless it appears from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein." Additionally, the respondents cite Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[20] to bolster their claim that the petition at bench should be dismissed. | |||||
|
2005-04-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[41] it was ruled that the basis of the right of the first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase of any prospective buyer. It is only after the grantee fails to exercise its right of first priority under the same terms and within the period contemplated, could the owner validly offer to sell the property to a third person, again, under the same terms as offered to the grantee. The circumstances of this case, however, dictate the application of a different ruling. An offer of the property to petitioner under identical terms and conditions of the offer previously given to respondent Pacunayen would be inequitable. The subject property was sold in 1990 to respondent Pacunayen for a measly sum of P10,000.00. Obviously, the value is in a small amount because the sale was between a mother and daughter. As admitted by said respondent, "the sale made in her favor by her mother was just a formality so that she may have the proper representation with TRCDC in the absence of her parents..."[42] Consequently, the offer to be made to petitioner in this case should be under reasonable terms and conditions, taking into account the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to respondent. | |||||
|
2005-03-18 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the decision is contrary to P.D. No. 1517.[27] They alleged that respondent did not allege in her complaint, and neither has she proven by her evidence that the lot involved is within the urban zone proclaimed as urban land reform area so that she, as an actual occupant thereof, might be the rightful beneficiary of the right of first refusal, invoking Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[28] and Lagmay vs. Court of Appeals.[29] Petitioners subsequently filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration citing Solanda Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[30] to bolster their position.[31] Respondent opposed petitioners' motion for reconsideration.[32] | |||||
|
2004-07-07 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[9] we held that matters which require presentation and/or determination of facts raised in a motion to dismiss can be best resolved after trial on the merits, thus: "x x x, we find no more need to pass upon the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action for damages or whether the complaint is barred by estoppel or laches. As these matters require presentation and/or determination of facts, they can be best resolved after trial on the merits. | |||||
|
2000-04-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear provision of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.[14] This is clear from Parañaque Kings Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals,[15] where this Court rejected a similar defense- | |||||