This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2007-09-11 |
TINGA, J, |
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| We do not agree with appellants' claim that AAA's failure to present any medical certificate issued by her examining physician is fatal to the prosecution's cause. A medical certificate is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. The non-presentation of the medical certificate, which is merely corroborative, does not give rise to the presumption that if presented, it would be adverse to the prosecution.[30] The testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime.[31] | |||||
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2003-06-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The Court was able to observe the demeanor of the private complainant when she was examined in open court; she was spontaneous in her giving of answers to questions propounded by counsel for the accused and her answers were clothed with sincerity and in fact she was crying when she gave her testimony.[10] The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him.[11] The fact that the judge who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision was not the one who heard the evidence does not render the judgment void per se.[12] However, respondent judge should have exercised caution and carefully scrutinized the draft decision to make the necessary corrections before affixing his signature thereon. His failure to do so betrays his carelessness and laziness, which are anathema to the professional competence and diligence required of judges, to wit:CANON 3 A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE. | |||||
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2000-07-14 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| That Zenaida was able to recognize appellant by the light of the gas lamp is not farfetched. This Court has ruled that illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, like a "gasera" or "lampara" is sufficient for the identification of persons.[50] Identification was, likewise, facilitated by the fact that Zenaida was familiar with the features of appellant who was her husband's cousin. Thus, in one case, the Court held that the distance of 40 to 45 meters of the witness from the crime scene, taken by itself, may lead the Court to entertain doubts on the accuracy of what a witness has observed but once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.[51] That the crime transpired at night is immaterial because Zenaida first saw appellant when he was barely two (2) meters away from her. | |||||