This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The present petition basically questions the appreciation of facts on the part of the CA. As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[6] The Court is thus generally bound by the CA's factual findings. There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing, among which is when the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.[7] The present petition falls under the exception due to the different factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA. | |||||
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2014-04-02 |
REYES, J. |
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| It is an oft-repeated rule that in labor cases, as in other administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, "the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."[32] "[T]he burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue."[33] Corollarily, as Francisco was claiming to be an employee of the respondents, it is incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of said relationship. | |||||
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2014-02-26 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence,[18] or that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.[19] In fine, mindful of the nature of the charge of ULP, including its civil and/or criminal consequences, the Court finds that the NLRC, as correctly sustained by the CA, had sufficient factual and legal bases to support its finding of ULP. | |||||
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2013-07-29 |
BRION, J. |
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| At the outset, we emphasize the settled rule that only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review on certiorari.[37] This Court's power of review in a Rule 45 petition is limited to resolving matters pertaining to perceived legal errors that the CA may have committed in issuing the assailed decision,[38] in contrast with the review for jurisdictional errors that we undertake in an original certiorari action.[39] In reviewing the legal correctness of the CA decision in a labor case taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we examine the CA decision in the context that it determined the presence or the absence of a grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision, on the merits of the case, was correct.[40] In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.[41] | |||||
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2013-07-03 |
REYES, J. |
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| Settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. In labor cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[37] In disability claims, as in the case at bar, the employee bears the onus to prove by substantial evidence his own positive assertions.[38] | |||||
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2012-06-20 |
REYES, J. |
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| The instant petition ascribes misappreciation of facts on the part of the CA, which if allegedly reconsidered, would yield a conclusion favorable to the petitioners. As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[30] The Court is thus generally bound by the CA's factual findings. There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing, among which is when the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.[31] The instant petition falls under the aforementioned exception in the light of the divergent factual findings of the VA and the CA. | |||||
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2012-01-16 |
REYES, J. |
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| The logical conclusion that may be deduced from these attending circumstances is that the petitioner was a party, or at the very least, one who agreed to the installation of the shunted wires, and who also benefited from the illegal connection at the expense of his employer-company. In sustaining the CA's findings, we consider the rule that in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, as in proceedings before the NLRC which had original jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[21] | |||||