This case has been cited 23 times or more.
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2015-08-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| On the other hand, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party may seek intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in the administrative level.[145] If there is still a remedy available within the administrative machinery, "then such remedy should be exhausted first before [the] court's judicial power can be sought."[146] The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that both the courts and the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction. This is because non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction.[147] In Soto v. Jareno,[148] this court ruled:Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.[149] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2015-08-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| While both the court and the administrative agency have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the general rule is that the courts, because of comity, practicality, and convenience, will not interfere with the administrative process until the process comes to an end.[150] This is because availing administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and results in a speedier resolution of controversies.[151] On the other hand, since the court and the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction, exceptions may be warranted by the circumstances,[152] and the court may choose to assume jurisdiction over the controversy. | |||||
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2015-04-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| On the other hand, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party may seek intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the remedies in the administrative level.[145] If there is still a remedy available within the administrative machinery, "then such remedy should be exhausted first before [the] court's judicial power can be sought."[146] The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that both the courts and the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction. This is because non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction.[147] In Soto v. Jareno,[148] this court ruled:Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.[149] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2015-04-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| While both the court and the administrative agency have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the general rule is that the courts, because of comity, practicality, and convenience, will not interfere with the administrative process until the process comes to an end.[150] This is because availing administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and results in a speedier resolution of controversies.[151] On the other hand, since the court and the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction, exceptions may be warranted by the circumstances,[152] and the court may choose to assume jurisdiction over the controversy. | |||||
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2015-01-13 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| [The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies] is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,[155] (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,(5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[156] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) | |||||
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2013-10-22 |
REYES, J. |
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| The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that it was denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[12] | |||||
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2013-01-15 |
REYES, J. |
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| The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[32] | |||||
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2009-09-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion x x x was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, x x x the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[22] (Emphasis in the original.) | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Before finally writing finis to this case, the Court still finds it necessary to address the remaining issue on the supposed failure of the NCR Regional Director to exhaust administrative remedies. Montoya argues that the NCR Regional Director failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he appealed the 10 November 2003 Decision of DILG Secretary Lina directly to the CSC, without first filing an appeal with the Office of the President. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought.[30] The administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum.[31] | |||||
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2008-11-26 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. x x x[34] | |||||
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2008-06-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons; for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.[25] | |||||
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2008-06-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In Dy v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court held that:This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours) | |||||
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2006-11-24 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As regards the second issue, we find that petitioner was not deprived of due process. It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.[27] Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard and given the opportunity to present his side.[28] In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held:Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.[30] | |||||
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2006-02-13 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| However, the Court recognizes some exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As held in Paat v. Court of Appeals:[14] | |||||
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2004-11-11 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with.[22] | |||||
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2004-01-13 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,[41] provides that any violation thereof "shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309[42] and 310[43] of Revised Penal Code." This amendment -- which eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" -- has already been interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute distinct offenses that are now independent of the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under these articles.[44] | |||||
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2004-01-13 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436[6] authorizing Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also | |||||
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2003-12-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The settled rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.[13] | |||||
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2003-07-14 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| It is clear that respondent failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies available to him. The rule is that, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be availed of by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.[30] | |||||
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2003-04-10 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.[3] Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention;[4] and (b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[5] | |||||
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2002-08-07 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| counter-affidavits to disprove the accusation leveled against them, thus; respondent-appellant and his co-respondent were not denied their constitutional right to due process.[17] Furthermore, lack of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[18] The resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration clearly shows that petitioner was given every | |||||
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2001-09-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Complainant avers that replevin is not available where the properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings for illegal logging. He points out that this is a well-settled issue and cites several decisions[5] of this Court and the Court of Appeals on the matter. He argues that respondent judge should have known of the existing jurisprudence on this issue, particularly since they are subject to mandatory judicial notice per Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. | |||||