Lawyerly

GR No. 147786

2004-01-20

QUISUMBING, J.

The award of P500,000 in compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be deleted. The victim's mother, Remedios Keyser, testified that the victim was earning around P50,000.00 a month[63] as shown in the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics Phils. Co.[64] However, said receipt shows that it was made out to her, and not the victim. Moreover, it does not show what period is covered by the receipt. Hence, the actual value of the loss of earning capacity was not adequately established. Awards for the loss of earning capacity partake of the nature of damages, and must be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof.[65]

GR No. 137296

2003-06-26

PEOPLE v. DIONISIO VICENTE Y QUINTO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Certainly, the victim's act of aggression during the first stage of the incident does not justify appellant's conduct during the second stage. Settled is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense is committed.[41]

GR No. 139907

2003-03-28

PEOPLE v. MARCELO BATES

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

After scrutiny of the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court that self-defense was not established by appellant. He testified that he initially inflicted only a single hack wound on the neck of Jose causing the latter to fall to the ground. He then went to the aid of his brother Carlito but upon finding that he was already dead, he went back to where Jose fell. Appellant admitted that at that time, Jose was in a lying position still alive but hardly moving.[8] Under such a situation, Jose could have hardly put up any defense, much less, make an aggressive move against appellant. Despite Jose's condition, appellant repeatedly hacked Jose. Granting that Jose was the one who first committed unlawful aggression, appellant was no longer justified in further inflicting wounds upon Jose because at that time, the latter was already lying helpless on the ground. At that moment, unlawful aggression on the part of Jose had ceased. It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.[9] Hence, the fact that unlawful aggression on the part of Jose already ceased when Marcelo repeatedly hacked him rules out the possibility of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.[10] Thus, the first assigned error is without merit.

GR No. 137406

2003-03-26

PEOPLE v. ROGELIO DELADA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect admitted that he killed Paredes, thereby shifting the burden of proving all the elements of this justifying circumstance to him. These elements are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these requisites, unlawful aggression, or the sudden and unprovoked attack on the person defending himself, is indispensable. Without this element, no claim of self-defense can prosper.[14]

GR No. 134762

2002-07-23

PEOPLE v. ROMEO FERNANDEZ

QUISUMBING, J.

might make.[42] It is settled that there is treachery if the victim, when killed, was sleeping[43] or had just awakened,[44] because in such cases the victim was in no position to put up any form of defense. However, the prosecution must still establish how the attack commenced.[45] When Mrs. Bates went out of the house to call Danilo, she saw appellant already attacking her son who was lying on the bench. She claimed that her son was sleeping, but presented no evidence to show that he was actually asleep when attacked and thus had no opportunity to defend himself. Where no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim's death began and developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.[46] Any doubt as to the existence of the treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[47][47] Note that the information also alleged "evident premeditation." Our perusal of the records, however, fails to disclose any factual basis for the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Evident premeditation may not be appreciated where there is no proof as to how

GR Nos. 131022

2000-12-14

PEOPLE v. ROGER ANIVADO

MENDOZA, J.

Finally, the prosecution claimed compensation for unearned income because Rosalinda Acenas testified that, at the time of his death, Restituto Acenas was earning a monthly income of at least P14,100.00 for managing their welding shop and their rice mill.[48] However, the trial court correctly denied the claim. Unearned income partakes of the nature of damages, and, therefore, must be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but by unbiased proof.[49] In People v. Cotas,[50] we ruled that if the only evidence to prove unearned income is the testimony of the deceased's common-law wife, the same is insufficient for being self-serving. So it is in the present case where the only evidence is Rosalinda Acenas' testimony.

GR No. 124475

2000-11-29

PEOPLE v. VS.JOHN PANELA

MENDOZA, J.

The trial court should also have appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in accused-appellant's favor. The evidence shows that immediately after the killing, accused-appellant went to the house of Purok President Efren Alarilla. He told Alarilla of his intention to surrender so that when Alarilla called the police, accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up. The following requisites of voluntary surrender were present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. That accused-appellant first went to Efren Alarilla's house and not directly to the police is of no moment since the latter merely acted as an intermediary, and such is recognized by law.[38]

GR No. 129252

2000-11-28

PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO CABER

MENDOZA, J.

Nevertheless, accused-appellant should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The requisites for this circumstance are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender must be voluntary.[25] In this case, the evidence shows that shortly after stabbing Ramirez, accused-appellant gave himself up to barangay tanod Julian Rama who then arranged for his surrender to the city police. Although a barangay tanod is not a person in authority but only an agent of a person in authority,[26] nevertheless, Rama could be treated as an intermediary to accused-appellant's surrender so as to justify appreciating this mitigating circumstance in favor of accused-appellant.[27]

GR No. 132784

2000-10-30

PEOPLE v. LEONILO VILLARBA Y BAUTISTA

MENDOZA, J.

The contention has no merit. Although, in general, testimonial evidence is insufficient to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity,[43] we have allowed claims for unearned income to prosper when documentary evidence is unavailable

GR No. 113446

2000-08-04

PEOPLE v. ELMER FEGIDERO Y CORDOVA

PARDO, J.

"fn">[34] Considering, however, that at the time the crime was committed death penalty was proscribed under the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty can not be imposed herein. The trial court did not err when it meted out on accused Elmer Fegidero y Cordova the penalty of reclusion perpetua. We affirm the award of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, as death indemnity. Pursuant to the provision of Article 2219(1), in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, an award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos is reasonable.[35] WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila in Criminal Case No. 93-118514 finding accused Elmer Fegidero y Cordova guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, defined

GR No. 128551

2000-07-31

PEOPLE v. RAMIL SAMOLDE Y TAMBUNTING

MENDOZA, J.

As regards the victim's loss of earning capacity, the only evidence offered by the prosecution is the widow's testimony that, at the time of his death, Feliciano Nepomuceno was earning P1,800.00 a month. Awards for the loss of earning capacity partake of the nature of damages and must thus be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof.[58] In the case at bar, we find the testimony by the widow Arsenia Nepomuceno to be self-serving and insufficient to justify an award of unearned income to her.

	GR No. 147786 2004-01-20	PEOPLE v. ERIC GUILLERMO Y GARCIA QUISUMBING, J.
The award of P500,000 in compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be deleted. The victim's mother, Remedios Keyser, testified that the victim was earning around P50,000.00 a month[63] as shown in the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics Phils. Co.[64] However, said receipt shows that it was made out to her, and not the victim. Moreover, it does not show what period is covered by the receipt. Hence, the actual value of the loss of earning capacity was not adequately established. Awards for the loss of earning capacity partake of the nature of damages, and must be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof.[65]
	GR No. 137296 2003-06-26	PEOPLE v. DIONISIO VICENTE Y QUINTO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Certainly, the victim's act of aggression during the first stage of the incident does not justify appellant's conduct during the second stage. Settled is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense is committed.[41]
	GR No. 139907 2003-03-28	PEOPLE v. MARCELO BATES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
After scrutiny of the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court that self-defense was not established by appellant. He testified that he initially inflicted only a single hack wound on the neck of Jose causing the latter to fall to the ground. He then went to the aid of his brother Carlito but upon finding that he was already dead, he went back to where Jose fell. Appellant admitted that at that time, Jose was in a lying position still alive but hardly moving.[8] Under such a situation, Jose could have hardly put up any defense, much less, make an aggressive move against appellant. Despite Jose's condition, appellant repeatedly hacked Jose. Granting that Jose was the one who first committed unlawful aggression, appellant was no longer justified in further inflicting wounds upon Jose because at that time, the latter was already lying helpless on the ground. At that moment, unlawful aggression on the part of Jose had ceased. It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.[9] Hence, the fact that unlawful aggression on the part of Jose already ceased when Marcelo repeatedly hacked him rules out the possibility of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.[10] Thus, the first assigned error is without merit.
	GR No. 137406 2003-03-26	PEOPLE v. ROGELIO DELADA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect admitted that he killed Paredes, thereby shifting the burden of proving all the elements of this justifying circumstance to him. These elements are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these requisites, unlawful aggression, or the sudden and unprovoked attack on the person defending himself, is indispensable. Without this element, no claim of self-defense can prosper.[14]
	GR No. 134762 2002-07-23	PEOPLE v. ROMEO FERNANDEZ QUISUMBING, J.
might make.[42] It is settled that there is treachery if the victim, when killed, was sleeping[43] or had just awakened,[44] because in such cases the victim was in no position to put up any form of defense. However, the prosecution must still establish how the attack commenced.[45] When Mrs. Bates went out of the house to call Danilo, she saw appellant already attacking her son who was lying on the bench. She claimed that her son was sleeping, but presented no evidence to show that he was actually asleep when attacked and thus had no opportunity to defend himself. Where no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim's death began and developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.[46] Any doubt as to the existence of the treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[47][47] Note that the information also alleged "evident premeditation." Our perusal of the records, however, fails to disclose any factual basis for the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Evident premeditation may not be appreciated where there is no proof as to how
	GR Nos. 131022 2000-12-14	PEOPLE v. ROGER ANIVADO MENDOZA, J.
Finally, the prosecution claimed compensation for unearned income because Rosalinda Acenas testified that, at the time of his death, Restituto Acenas was earning a monthly income of at least P14,100.00 for managing their welding shop and their rice mill.[48] However, the trial court correctly denied the claim. Unearned income partakes of the nature of damages, and, therefore, must be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but by unbiased proof.[49] In People v. Cotas,[50] we ruled that if the only evidence to prove unearned income is the testimony of the deceased's common-law wife, the same is insufficient for being self-serving. So it is in the present case where the only evidence is Rosalinda Acenas' testimony.
	GR No. 124475 2000-11-29	PEOPLE v. VS.JOHN PANELA MENDOZA, J.
The trial court should also have appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in accused-appellant's favor. The evidence shows that immediately after the killing, accused-appellant went to the house of Purok President Efren Alarilla. He told Alarilla of his intention to surrender so that when Alarilla called the police, accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up. The following requisites of voluntary surrender were present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. That accused-appellant first went to Efren Alarilla's house and not directly to the police is of no moment since the latter merely acted as an intermediary, and such is recognized by law.[38]
	GR No. 129252 2000-11-28	PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO CABER MENDOZA, J.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The requisites for this circumstance are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender must be voluntary.[25] In this case, the evidence shows that shortly after stabbing Ramirez, accused-appellant gave himself up to barangay tanod Julian Rama who then arranged for his surrender to the city police. Although a barangay tanod is not a person in authority but only an agent of a person in authority,[26] nevertheless, Rama could be treated as an intermediary to accused-appellant's surrender so as to justify appreciating this mitigating circumstance in favor of accused-appellant.[27]
	GR No. 132784 2000-10-30	PEOPLE v. LEONILO VILLARBA Y BAUTISTA MENDOZA, J.
The contention has no merit. Although, in general, testimonial evidence is insufficient to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity,[43] we have allowed claims for unearned income to prosper when documentary evidence is unavailable
	GR No. 113446 2000-08-04	PEOPLE v. ELMER FEGIDERO Y CORDOVA PARDO, J.
"fn">[34] Considering, however, that at the time the crime was committed death penalty was proscribed under the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty can not be imposed herein. The trial court did not err when it meted out on accused Elmer Fegidero y Cordova the penalty of reclusion perpetua. We affirm the award of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, as death indemnity. Pursuant to the provision of Article 2219(1), in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, an award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos is reasonable.[35] WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila in Criminal Case No. 93-118514 finding accused Elmer Fegidero y Cordova guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, defined
	GR No. 128551 2000-07-31	PEOPLE v. RAMIL SAMOLDE Y TAMBUNTING MENDOZA, J.
As regards the victim's loss of earning capacity, the only evidence offered by the prosecution is the widow's testimony that, at the time of his death, Feliciano Nepomuceno was earning P1,800.00 a month. Awards for the loss of earning capacity partake of the nature of damages and must thus be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof.[58] In the case at bar, we find the testimony by the widow Arsenia Nepomuceno to be self-serving and insufficient to justify an award of unearned income to her.

PEOPLE v. TEOFISTO COTAS Y LIMPIAHOY