This case has been cited 12 times or more.
|
2012-10-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| In finding the existence of these elements, the trial and appellate courts in the present case upheld the credibility of the testimony of PO1 Memoracion, as supported by the testimony of PO1 Arago. In this regard, We find no sufficient reason to interfere with the findings of the RTC on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses pursuant to the principle that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight and sometimes, even with finality.[18] Where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court's assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.[19] The rationale behind this principle was explained by the Court in People v. Dinglasan,[20] to wit: In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might affect the result of the case. (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
|
2011-08-24 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| It was established in this case that Nelson was attacked with treachery because aside from having had no idea of what was to befall him when he stood up as Cleofe and Leonardo approached him, Nelson was also defenseless against the sudden gunshots Leonardo delivered to him. The fact that the attack on Nelson was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery in this case as the same made the attack no less unexpected and sudden.[60] | |||||
|
2011-03-09 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might affect the result of the case.[15] (Emphasis Ours.) | |||||
|
2010-09-06 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| The settled rule is that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.[27] (underscoring supplied) | |||||
|
2002-08-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[17] Additionally, we find that conspiracy was adequately established by the prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[18] To establish conspiracy, proof of a | |||||
|
2002-02-15 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
||||
| For appellant's alibi to prosper, he must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[43] As the trial court found, although appellant claimed that he was in Cebu when the crime was committed on August 20, 1996, he failed to adduce evidence such as plane, boat or bus tickets, hotel bills or meal receipts or any document evincing the sale of his fighting cocks to substantiate his alibi. The trial court took cognizance of the fact that bus, boat or air transportation is readily available between Bacolod and Cebu; hence, it is not physically impossible for a person to leave Cebu at any time of the day and be in Bacolod in just a matter of hours or minutes by plane.[44] Appellant failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victim's store at the time the crime was committed, apart from his self-serving declaration that he was in Cebu and despite the unconvincing testimony of Dax Villadelgado. Significantly, appellant's friend and witness, Roberto Picuncillo, who resides in the same barangay of the appellant and the victim, contradicted with his testimony the appellant's alibi that he was in Cebu up to the last week of August 1996. Picuncillo testified that he saw the appellant on August 20, 1996, the date when the crime was committed. More importantly, considering the positive identification of the appellant, as the assailant, by prosecution witnesses, Lucia Hijapon and Buenaventura Hijapon, the defense of alibi must necessarily fail. Alibi cannot stand against strong and positive identification.[45] | |||||
|
2001-11-22 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| We only need to stress that the prosecution witnesses had no reason to particularly implicate appellant in a serious crime. No motive was shown to discredit their testimonies. With two positive identifications, the appellant's weak alibi and bare denial cannot prevail. Alibi cannot stand against strong and positive identification.[18] | |||||
|
2000-12-14 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| Accused-appellant Erly Lignes asserts that the failure of Clementina Gimenez to actually witness the killing of her son and her husband is adequate proof that she failed to identify him as the killer. We do not agree. Accused-appellant seems to have overlooked the significance of conspiracy, as a rule for collective criminal liability, where it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim.[15] The fact that accused-appellant conspired in the commission of the crime charged was sufficiently and convincingly shown by his active participation in ransacking the belongings of the two (2) Gimenez families, tying and holding Francisco and Erlinda's son immobile while the others led the two (2) hapless victims to the threshold of their obliteration. | |||||
|
2000-07-14 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
||||
| Appellant's contention that the prosecution's omission to present an autopsy report, ballistic examination report and other reliable scientific reports to match physical evidence with Zenaida's testimony constituted "loose ends" that derailed the prosecution's case[67] is devoid of merit. Those reports would have been indispensable had there been no credible eyewitness to the crime as they would only be corroborative in nature. Thus, the non-presentation of the weapon in a murder case is not fatal to the prosecution's case because of the positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness.[68] The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt, through the credible testimony of Zenaida, the identity of that appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Because of the positive identification by Zenaida, appellant's alibi and denial were rendered unworthy of credit.[69] Moreover, appellant's alibi was not established in accordance with law. It is well-settled that in order for an alibi to prevail, the defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else.[70] As borne out by the records, the defense was not able to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the crime scene. Appellant was allegedly in Barangay Sidem which is located in the same municipality of Gattaran, the site of the crime. The fact that the crime scene and the place where appellant claimed to be at during the crucial days of the perpetration of the crime are shown by appellant's own admission that he allegedly heard the gunshot that killed Aurelio. | |||||