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DANILO E. PARAS v. COMELEC

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR Nos. 176935-36 2014-10-20	ZAMBALES II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. CASTILLEJOS CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION BRION, J.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a law must be construed as a whole. This means that the meaning of the law or its intent (to repeal or not an earlier law) is not to be extracted from a single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences, but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole.[55] In short, every provision of the law must be considered together with the other provisions, and must be kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment as a whole.[56]
	GR No. 181613 2009-09-11	ROSALINDA A. PENERA v. COMELEC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The Dissenting Opinion, therefore, should not be too quick to pronounce the ineffectiveness or repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code just because of a change in the meaning of candidate by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, primarily, for administrative purposes. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.[45] Indeed, not only will the prohibited act of premature campaigning be officially decriminalized, the value and significance of having a campaign period before the conduct of elections would also be utterly negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead of everyone else. Such is the very evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an absurd situation.
	GR No. 174971 2008-10-15	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. AMS FARMING CORPORATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[29] Section 6 of the CARL specifically governs retention limits, and the last paragraph thereof must be interpreted or construed in accordance with the context of said section. Simply, what the last paragraph of Section 6 of the CARL considers null and void are lease agreements or any other contract involving private lands executed with the intention of circumventing and violating the retention limits set by the CARL. Consistent therewith, Section 73(a) of the same law expressly prohibits the ownership or possession of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those under collective ownership by farmer-beneificiaries.
	GR NO. 139303 2005-08-25	CIPRIANO ENRIQUEZ v. MAXIMO ENRIQUEZ SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.[4] Petitioners cannot give a different interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall be made only upon their receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay. For it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[5] Indeed, petitioners cannot deviate from the Rule.