This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-07-27 |
BRION, J. |
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| When the airport expansion project fell through, respondents Melba Limbaco, Ramon Logarta, and Linda Logarta, the legal heirs of Ouano, succeeded in reclaiming title to the two lots through an action for reconveyance filed with the lower court; [8] the titles over these lots were thereafter registered in their names. [9] They then subdivided the two lots [10] and sold them to New Ventures Realty Corporation, Eugenio Amores, Henry See, Freddie Go, Benedict Que, Petrosa, and AWG. AWG, in turn, sold one of the parcels of land to UCB. All the buyers registered the titles over their respective lots in their names. | |||||
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2010-02-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As correctly found by the CA, unlike in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[20] cited by petitioners, where respondent therein offered testimonies which were hearsay in nature, the testimony of Lozada was based on personal knowledge as the assurance from the government was personally made to him. His testimony on cross-examination destroyed neither his credibility as a witness nor the truthfulness of his words. | |||||
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2008-11-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| To prove their claim, respondents presented witnesses who testified that the NAC promised their predecessors-in-interest-original owners of Lot No. 988 that it would be returned to them should the expansion of the Cebu Lahug Airport not materialize.[6] And respondents invoked this Court's ruling in MCIAA v. Court of Appeals[7] involving another lot acquired by the NAC for the expansion of the Cebu Lahug Airport. In that case, although the deed of sale between the therein respondent Melba Limbaco's predecessor-in-interest and NAC did not contain a provision for the repurchase of the therein subject lot should the purpose for its acquisition ceased to exist, this Court allowed Melba Limbaco to recover the lot based on parole evidence that the NAC promised the right of repurchase to her predecessor-in-interest.[8] | |||||
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2006-11-02 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| At the outset, we tackle the three (3) procedural issues raised by respondent Uy in his September 6, 2000 Comment[20] to bolster his position that the petition should be dismissed. Respondent contends that the petition ought to be dismissed outright as petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration from the assailed CA Decision, an alleged pre-requisite before this Court can entertain petitions under Rule 45. Respondent cites Ybañez v. Court of Appeals,[21] Tan v. Court of Appeals,[22] Villarama v. NLRC,[23] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[24] and Sunshine Transportation, Inc. v. NLRC[25] as authorities. Moreover, respondent Uy maintains that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective as only one of the petitioners affixed his signature, (Ramon P. Ereneta) and such sole signatory cannot represent petitioner BCDA as no Board Resolution was presented conferring such authority. Lastly, said respondent asserts that there is no proper joinder of parties considering that the major issue raised by petitioner BCDA is its invocation of RA 7227. | |||||
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2003-06-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Godofredo and Carmen cannot invoke the Statute of Frauds to deny the existence of the verbal contract of sale because they have performed their obligations, and have accepted benefits, under the verbal contract. [20] Armando and Adelia have also performed their obligations under the verbal contract. Clearly, both the sellers and the buyers have consummated the verbal contract of sale of the Subject Land. The Statute of Frauds was enacted to prevent fraud.[21] This law cannot be used to advance the very evil the law seeks to prevent. | |||||