This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| While it may be acknowledged that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the acceptance of the appeal despite its late filing,[70] none exists at the case at bar. Quite beyond cavil, the delay incurred by the counsel of DAMBA-NFSW in filing the Notice of Appeal, totaling 14 days, was simply inexcusable. This Court had already held that "(a)n erroneous application of the law or rules is not excusable error."[71] | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Certainly, we cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion upon a court that denies a motion for extension of time filed after the expiration of the reglementary period to file a petition. A motion for extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the expiration or lapse of the period set by law, otherwise, there is no longer any period to extend and the judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory.[20] Once the judgment becomes final and executory, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to modify or reverse it. | |||||
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2005-12-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A final note. We feel the need to point out that the delay incurred by counsel for petitioner employees in filing the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was inexcusable. Their counsel's claim of ignorance exacerbates more than relieves him of accountability for his negligence. We can not over-emphasize that lawyers are duty-bound, nay, mandated, by the oath they took, to keep abreast of legal developments and to participate in continuing legal education programs.[23] To reiterate, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. The rules on periods for filing appeals are to be observed religiously, and parties who seek to avail themselves of the privilege must comply with the rules.[24] | |||||
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2004-10-22 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Petitioners invoke a liberal interpretation of procedural rules in the interest of justice. According to them, the dismissal of their appeal on the sole ground of one-day delay will gravely prejudice their right to be given the amplest opportunity to be heard on appeal. In support of their contention, petitioners cite our rulings in several cases where, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, we stayed the dismissal of an appeal based on a technicality. They maintain that the case relied upon by the Court of Appeals, namely Ditching v. Court of Appeals,[17] should not be applied to their case considering the difference in circumstances. In Ditching, the Notice of Appeal was filed twenty (20) days late due to the negligence of counsel. Petitioners argue that their one-day delay may be excused as the inadvertence was due to the volume and pressure of work brought about by numerous cases handled by their counsel. | |||||
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2004-03-03 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to keep track of their applications. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is a decision on the merits. (Emphasis supplied) Since petitioner received CSC Resolution No. 01-0726 on 24 April 2001, she had until 9 May 2001 to file with the Court of Appeals her appeal or motion for extension.[19] However, the motion for extension to file petition for review and petition for review were both filed only on 31 May 2001. Clearly, petitioner filed the motion for extension and the petition for review beyond the prescribed period. In Ditching v. Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that if a motion for extension is filed after the lapse of the period sought to be extended, then there is no longer any period to extend. In such event, the judgment or order is already final and executory. | |||||